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ABSTRACT 
 
East Asia today draws attention of the world with the rise of China that led 
the shifts of the world system from a US-centric uni-polar to a new multi-polar. 
East Asia increasingly becomes more interconnected and interdependent through 
the process of regionalization, but compare to the regionalism of other regions, 
East Asia’s political, economic, and cultural integration or cooperation among 
states are negligible.  
 
Using primary and secondary sources, this thesis evaluates the current 
development of East Asian regional integration and looks at Japan and South 
Korea’s engagement in East Asian regionalism as a primary factor that has 
disrupted the progress of East Asian regionalism. Major topics of debate include 
the characteristics of East Asian regionalism, the presence of Japan and South 
Korea’s rivalry, and difference in region targeted for cooperation between the two 
countries. This thesis argues Japan and South Korea’s rivalry and difference in the 
scope of interest in regional cooperation have troubled two countries’ 
collaboration. Moreover, this uncooperative relation between Japan and Korea 
influenced the slow progress of East Asian regionalism. The analysis of Japan and 
South Korea’s engagement in regional trade and environmental interaction 
authenticate the two countries’ lack of coordination and fragile coexistence. For 
instance, the failure of Japan-Korea FTA has disrupted the liberalization of trade 
in the region and Japan and Korea’s lack of a collaborative relationship in 
establishing a regional environment institution has stalled environmental 
integration in the area. 
 
The confrontation between Japan and Korea, who are the only two advanced 
powers in East Asia, has significant influence over the development of integration 
in East Asia. Even though Japan and South Korea have historical tensions from 
the past, rivalry, and different scope of interests, if they maintain cooperative 
relations, they could model and inspire other East Asian countries to participate 
more in regional integration. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalization is a process of international integration, migrating idea, 
resources, labor force, money, and so on. It has speeded worldwide 
interconnections in many areas of industries and relations through cooperation 
among nations. International trade, monetary transactions, multinational 
corporations, technical and scientific cooperation, cultural exchange of new types 
and scales, telecommunication, migration, and relations between world’s richest 
and poorest countries are increased by globalization (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 
2011, p.17).  
 
Buzan and Waever (2003) explained regionalism as the process of 
increasing cooperation among states in particular geographic regions in political 
and economic fields and is one of the representing features of the contemporary 
international system. There are three major moves of regionalism: first involved 
the regionalism in Europe; second involved the regional entities around the 
Americas; and the last involved regionalism in Asia. Initiated by Europe in the 
21
st
 century, countries of geographical, cultural, and social proximity have 
integrated (Katzenstein, 2005). 
 
Regionalism has become increasingly important for countries especially 
with the success of the European regionalism. Regionalism improved the 
competitiveness of Europe in economy, politics, and social elements. European 
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nations cooperated to expand and deepen their networks. After European 
regionalism succeeded, North American regionalism took place with the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but the regionalism in East Asia has 
shown a slow progress of strengthening its regional integration as an entity. 
Therefore, this thesis examines the major reasons why East Asian regionalism has 
not progressed further and proceeded slowly.  
 
Southeast Asia has shown growth in regional cooperation while Northeast 
Asia has shown little progress in terms of the development of regional cooperation 
and cooperative institutions. Regardless of Southeast Asia’s regional integration, 
East Asia as a whole has not shown a clear East Asian regional community. Many 
past scholars have explained the reasons for the delay in East Asian regionalism, 
mainly the complex and complicated relations among Japan, China and 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the high US involvement. 
Previously raised factors also were good and well-searched, but this thesis raises 
additional factors such as Japan-Korea relations and South Korea’s role in East 
Asian regionalism. This paper will explain the issues between Japan and South 
Korea which are the most important factors to better explain the stalled East Asian 
regionalism. 
 
1.1 Regionalism 
To understand regionalism, the distinction between regional cooperation 
and regional integration is necessary. These terms are different by the degree of 
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their regional integration. Regional cooperation is the effort among states to meet 
the common objective by tackling specific common problems through cooperation 
(Yoshimatsu, 2008; Soderbaum, 2003). On the other hand, regional integration 
involves deeper and more complex commitments by the states. Some scholars 
highlight the establishment of supranational institutions and their independent 
activities as the core elements for regional integration (Walter, 1999, p.1). 
 
The Encyclopaedia of international relations and global politics defines 
regionalism as the process of intensifying cooperation among states or other 
actors politically and economically in particular geographic regions (Griffiths, 
2005, p.723). As the first coherent regionalism began in the 1950s and 1960s in 
Western Europe with the establishment of European Community, the conventional 
meaning of regionalism referred to the establishment of proximate regional trade 
relations (Ethier, 1998). On the other hand, regionalism has achieved not only 
through the economic cooperation but also for the political factors that prompt 
regional integration like the security issue. Countries are cautious about the 
internal and external threats that vary from local conflicts between neighboring 
counties to diplomatic interference or military intervention in the dimensions of 
politics, social, military, economic, and environment. These threats die out 
through confidence-building, mutual trust, and institution of peaceful conflict 
solution. For instance, ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) developed a 
comprehensive forum to discuss economic, political and security issues in the 
region, launching numerous meetings, setting mutual understanding and 
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establishing closer relationships with cohered regional countries (Yoshimatsu, 
2008, p.1). Moreover, collective response over the regional security issues made 
regional leaders react to not only the traditional security issues but also non-
traditional security issues such as infectious diseases, tsunami and pirate attacks at 
sea. Therefore, the dialogue of regionalism has expanded to agriculture, 
information technology, tourism, and the environment. 
 
Regionalism has undergone two big waves: the first wave (1945-1985) 
which strengthened at the end of the WW2 with the anxiety of anarchical 
international system, representing the security dilemma and the second wave 
(1985-present) which significantly changed the whole context of the previous 
regionalism, building a ‘new regionalism’ (Wunderlich, 2007; Fawcett, 2008, 
pp.5-10). The first wave of regionalism occurred after the Second World War. 
New sets of international institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton 
Woods/ GATT system were constructed to secure states. The improvements in 
regional cooperation and self-sufficiency afforded the better flexibility to regional 
actors. In consequences of the Cold War, responding to the shifting political, 
economic and security, the second wave of regionalism, called ‘new regionalism’ 
supervened. This ‘new regionalism’ nearly changed the whole context of previous 
regionalism. Globalization significantly contributed to this change. Globalization 
enabled countries’ rigid border protections to become blurred and arranged 
various regional trades. The liberalization of world trade and investment was the 
pivot of new regionalism, playing a vital role in countries’ economic growth and 
5 
 
overall development and contributing to the recent regional initiatives (Sachs & 
Warner, 1995). Countries with regional proximity arranged regional trades, and as 
they resulted the launch of three flocks of regionalism in the world hemispheres. 
First flock was the European regionalism. European regionalism represented a 
form of supranational integration, prioritizing regional economic and political 
interdependence. The idea of fostering the integration began from avoiding 
conflicts among European countries. Consequently, an explicit cohesion called the 
European Union (EU) has delivered a peace, stability and prosperity, elevated 
living standards and a single European currency (EU 2013). Second flock was the 
North American regionalism, constituting NAFTA in 1991. Canada, Mexico and 
the US signed for a trilateral rules-based trade bloc in North America. It generated 
economic growth and raised living standards of the people of all three member 
countries (GC 2013). Third flock was Asia, initiating from ASEAN and gradually 
extending its memberships of Asian countries. 
 
1.2  East Asian Regionalism 
The formation of an economic and monetary union in Europe and the 
success of NAFTA motivated East Asian economies to pursue regional trade 
arrangements. East Asian governments worried about the disadvantage in global 
competition with the absence of their own regional trade arrangements and sought 
to unite themselves to gain bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU, the US, and other 
groups. As a result, during the late 20
th
 and early 21
th
 century, East Asia’s intra-
regional cooperation increased substantially. 
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Cooperation in East Asia developed through several multilateral 
frameworks. First, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was 
established on August 8
th
 1967 under the declaration among Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Today, there are now ten member states 
associated in ASEAN, aiming to promote collective progress through the 
collaboration in the fields of economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and 
administration of member states (ASEAN, 2012a). ASEAN has been an 
instrumental part in a broad sense in the development of regionalism in East Asia.  
 
Second, the 1997/1998 financial crisis pulled East Asia to approach a new 
international agreement to fight against the economic depression and to avert 
another financial crisis. ASEAN and three major Northeast Asian countries 
launched multilateral framework called the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) to 
promote regional economic cooperation.
 1
 ASEAN+3 has been the core catalysis 
of deepening cooperation in East Asia which not only does it have high 
significance in strengthening the East Asia’s economic cooperation but also in 
other various areas including good, energy, health, and the environment.  
 
Third, the East Asia Summit (EAS), started in 2005 on the basis of 
ASEAN+3 framework, including Australia, New Zealand, and India. In 2011, the 
EAS became an 18-member institution by including the US and Russia as new 
                                                          
1
 ASEAN+3 has shown the cooperation in the field of economy and politics with the annual 
meeting by the heads of states (ASEANWEB, 2009). 
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members.
 2
 The EAS was the start up point to cover the broader areas beyond the 
ASEAN+3. The EAS has played a significant role in advancing regional 
cooperation with many East Asian countries. Moreover in November 2012 at the 
7
th
 EAS meeting, the leaders of 16 EAS members launched the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to deepen regional integration. 
 
In addition to these three frameworks, the East Asian countries also have 
advanced joint activities under the economic-oriented Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), the security related ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and 
other intra-regional cooperation (Plummer & Jones, 2006, p.33). 
3
 Likewise, 
ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea, being the key players have established 
several regional cooperation frameworks to advance East Asian regionalism. 
 
1.3 The Importance of Japan and South Korea in East Asian Regionalism 
Japan has played a crucial role in East Asia. Firstly, Japan has been a 
leading model for East Asian countries’ development. Japan’s successful post-war 
reconstruction and economic development via high investment, technology 
progress, good relations with world powers, and practicing ‘Japanese-style market 
system’ have helped many East Asian countries’ advancement (Otsubo, 2007; 
                                                          
2
 EAS was the important step in direction of regional integration and EAS has chiefly contributed 
to East Asia’s fast market expansion in production, investment, technology, and skilled human 
power through integration of regional economies (Kumar, Kesavapany, & Chaocheng, 2008, 
p.166). 
3
 Japan implemented a bilateral economic partnership agreement (EPA) with Singapore in 2002; 
while China had launched official negotiations with ASEAN countries to sign a free trade 
agreement (FTA) in 2010 in response to the Japan-Singapore negotiation; and Korea has also 
agreed on a similar negotiation with ASEAN (Plummer & Jones, 2006, p.33). 
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World Bank, 2011). East Asian countries have learned from Japan’s development 
and implemented similar policies adopted by Japan.  Secondly, Japan has put a 
real effort in East Asian regional cooperation. Japan’s diplomacy toward East 
Asia has not limited to financial aid and economic cooperation but expanded to 
multilateral cooperation on issues like sustainable growth and nuclear 
nonproliferation (Tanaka & Liff, 2009, p.3). Japanese leaders have been amicable 
to the prosperity of East Asian regionalism, offering technology, political and 
economic strategy, and aid to neighbor countries. 
 
 Unlike Japan and China, South Korea does not have a leadership role to 
which it can construct a regional network. However, South Korea is a middle 
power in East Asia in terms of its material capacities and its foreign policy 
behaviors, which has a better chance to cooperate between major powers and 
developing ones. Geographically, South Korea locates in between Japan and 
China, which makes South Korea in middle power to mediate between the two 
powers, as well as mediating between ASEAN and major powers in East Asia. 
Moreover, South Korea is one of the most active members of East Asian 
multilateral cooperation and regional integration by participating in ASEAN+3, 
ARF, APEC and the EAS. 
 
1.4 Objectives of Research 
The objectives of this research are threefold. First, it examines the 
development and major features of East Asian regionalism and explores factors 
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that have caused slow progress in East Asian regionalism. Second, it will identify 
factors that have caused slow progress in East Asian regionalism and will 
highlight a missing factor - Japan and South Korea’s relationship and their 
contributions to East Asian regional integration - that has prolonged the progress 
in East Asian regionalism. Third, it deepens the discussion on the contributions of 
Japan and South Korea to East Asian regionalism through two empirical studies 
and shows how they have played a crucial role in the progress of East Asian 
regionalism. 
 
1.5 Significance of Research 
East Asia set a goal of building an East Asian community but has not yet 
achieved it because of slow progress in integration among regional countries. East 
Asian countries have become more coherent through many integrative initiatives 
such as economic, political and socio-cultural exchanges. However, as time passes 
East Asian regional building becomes more complex to achieve because of 
regional rivalry, mistrust, and high national priority. This paper explores the 
causes that have influenced the slow progress of regional cooperation in East Asia 
by highlighting factors to which the past literature on East Asian regionalism has 
paid scant attention. Namely, it takes into account the possible influence of the 
Japanese-Korean relations on the initiation and development of regional 
integration in specific policy fields. The past researchers have not explored much 
for South Korea’s presence and nuanced relationships between Japan and South 
Korea in the process of regionalism in East Asia. Thus, this thesis, which 
10 
 
presumes that the Japan- Korea relationship has a great significance as being a 
pivotal cause of the region’s slow progress, can make contributions to deepening 
the understanding of causal mechanisms in which specific interstate relations and 
rivalry are related to the trajectory of regional integration and cooperation.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON SLOW PROGRESS IN EAST 
ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION 
 
This thesis examines the factors that disrupt regionalism in East Asia. East 
Asian countries’ differences in linguistics, beliefs, cultures, geographical 
dimensions, extreme rivalry between Japan and China, the US commitment to 
East Asia, East Asia’s dynamic states structures and many other factors have 
slowed down the progress in East Asian regionalism (Lincoln, 2004, p.15). By 
reviewing the past literatures and scholars’ interpretations on the regionalism in 
East Asia, this section identifies the pivotal factors that slowed down East Asian 
regional integration. This thesis contributes to the subject field by looking at 
points which were not stressed previously. This literature review categorizes the 
past scholars’ findings on East Asian regionalism’s steady progress into three 
major international relations theories: Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism. After 
reviewing these past studies, this chapter critically assesses previous literature and 
past arguments to show the originality of this thesis. 
 
2.1    Realism and Regionalism in East Asia 
Realism is the outset of international theory, derived from Hans 
Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, defining states as the unitary key actors in 
the international system and power as states’ objects, goals, and purposes (Viotti 
& Kauppi, 2012, pp.39-40). States are to be regarded as hosts of international 
affairs and relationship among states, determining the power distribution and 
stability (Little, 2007). The perspectives of realism on state-centrism and power 
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politics have become the contributing factor for international relations. Power 
refers to the ability to influence another actor to do or not to do regarding its 
interests, including military, economic, technological, diplomatic and other 
capacities of the states (Pearson, 2011). Historically, the structure of power and 
the flow of power have determined states’ position in the international relations. 
Waltz emphasized under the anarchic international order actors with power can 
influence the structure of international politics: the unipolar, bipolar and 
multipolar systems signify the structural change through the distribution of 
capabilities among the one, two and three or more great powers (Waltz 1979). 
Moreover, realists take interest in the balance of power. Balance of power 
originated from a national security enhancement by the hegemonic power that 
attacks weaker powers, providing incentives to the besieged states to create a 
united defence to counterbalance the hegemonic power (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2005, 
p.503). Realists believe that the hegemonic power constructs the global order and 
influences state relations and regional institutions by lowering the probability of 
war and freeing states from the security dilemma in an anarchic world (Lemke, 
2002, p.51). Namely, the conflicts and conflicting power relations among states 
characterize the international relations. 
 
2.1.1 Realist Based Research 
i) Lack of Leadership   
According to Realists, the maintenance of Cold War elements in East Asia, 
the intensive hegemonic rivalry between Japan and China, for example, have 
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caused the instability, absence of security and lack of leadership which eventually 
lead to the disintegration of East Asia (Katzenstein & Shiraishi, 1997, p.21). The 
relationship between Japan and China has improved since 1980s under the dual 
economic cooperation although they still hold each other in check. Japan had 
supported China to be the member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) and hoped to tie China into the networks of regional cooperation, 
believing it to be the best way to face China’s growing power (Kaifu, 1990). 
However, China’s expanding influence in East Asia has agitated Japan to cling to 
more power in the region since the late 1990s to check on China’s active 
participation in East Asia regional integration. Japan does not want China to claim 
over the supremacy in East Asia region, and China expects to push Japan out from 
the possibility of taking a leading position thus “China does not support Japan’s 
ambition to play a central role in the region” (Harris & Gerg, 2001, p.144).  
 
China and Japan’s power rivalry, which has disrupted regional cooperation 
stemmed from the unavailability of a hegemonic power or leadership in East Asia. 
Robert Gilpin explained a hegemon is necessary in providing stability and 
collective security in the midst of the anarchic international system. In Gilpin’s 
book called War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin concluded that the 
hegemon provides peace and stability of the world (Gilpin, 1983). Pax Britannica 
and Pax Americana correspond to Gilpin’s argument, a hegemonic power use its 
dominant position and ensure an orderly and peaceful international system. 
Accordingly, if there were predominant leadership in East Asia, conflicts among 
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China and Japan would not occur, and East Asian regional integration would have 
achieved much more easily from the sway of the hegemonic power. 
 
Hegemonic power refers to the dominant power that comprises of superior 
military capabilities, dominantly in control of trade, capital, and raw materials 
(Ikenberry, 2002, p.113). Robert Keohane defined hegemonic power as 
“preponderance of material resources” which enables the hegemon to enforce the 
order and rules to the world (Keohane, 1984, p.32). Hegemonic power has 
supremacy in solving international conflicts with its military power; supporting 
the institutionalization of a regional or global free trade system; and maintaining a 
stable economic condition (Gilpin, 1983; Keohane, 1989, Olson, 1971; Oneal & 
Diehl, 1994). This strong power is essential to direct and guide the group of 
countries to carry on collective actions. However, within East Asia, there is no 
country holding a hegemonic power. China and Japan are potential hegemonies, 
but both countries are full of antagonism and aspirations to hold regional 
leadership but yet do not have capabilities to become the hegemonic power 
(Nabers, 2008). China has developed surprisingly, but it is yet unable to initiate an East 
Asian multilateral institution while Japan able to lead discussions including East Asian 
countries but does not have exceeded power to override China (Ba, 2006). 
 
ii)     East Asia’s Reliance on the United States 
Aaron Louis Friedberg advocated in his work, International Security, in 
1993 that the continuing US engagement in East Asia was to be served as a 
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stabilizing power until regional integration and multilateral institutions develop 
(Friedberg, 1993-1994). Under the condition of uncertainty and competitive 
interactions by the US, contrary to some expected conflicts, several East Asian 
countries welcomed the US engagement. Representatively, Japan and South 
Korea built a close political and military alliance with the US based on sharing 
common interests, countering threats, building trust, and cooperating in most 
foreign affairs. South Korea has united with the US mainly with issues of 
economy, livelihood-travel, immigration and security - North Korea policy, 
prospects of the US-ROK relationship and future outlook of US-ROK military 
alliance over decades (Zumwalt, 2012). Moreover, Japan has maintained to be the 
closest ally of the US in East Asia over 50 years, guaranteeing its security with 
53,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan (Chanlett-Avery, 2011).  
 
However, this over dependency and intimate relations with the US have 
made Japan and South Korea hardly showed their discontent over the US’s 
requests and its strategies of maintaining its leading position and strong 
engagement to Asia. As a result, the US’s regional strategy objective has been 
constant since the end of the Cold War which does not allow any rising power to 
gain advantages and relies on Japan and South Korea as a part of its regional 
strategy in East Asia (Rice, 2000). The rise of China has challenged the US to be 
more involved and participated in East Asia by answering China’s challenge with 
its policy called “Pivot or Rebalance towards Asia” (Manyin et al., 2012). The 
growth of China has narrowed the gap between the US and China by becoming 
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the second largest economy in the world and largest exporter and manufacturer 
(Park, 2013, p.8). The United States (US) has fully perceived East Asian 
countries’ growing distrust over Chinese assertive actions in territorial issues, for 
instance that the US has pivoted Asia to reinsure the East Asian security under its 
security umbrella (Chari, 2013).  
 
The US’s incompatibility with China and compatibility with Japan and 
South Korea have influenced the relations among China, Japan and Korea. 
Furthermore, the US’s alliances with Japan and South Korea and its intimate 
bilateral relations with both countries have made the two countries rivals. 
Accordingly, good relations among East Asian countries became difficult because 
of the complex relationships East Asian countries have with the US. 
 
2.2         Liberalism and Regionalism in East Asia 
Liberal theory assumes that human nature is good and international 
relations are cooperative rather than conflictive (Moravcsik, 2008, p.239). 
Liberals take a positive view on a human nature. They believe humans are 
good-natured and individuals share many interests and engage in collaborative 
and cooperative social actions (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007, p.98). In other 
words, with good human nature, conflicts or war are not inevitable as they 
seek for the mutually beneficial cooperation within and outside of states.  
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There are four strands of liberal thoughts. First is the sociological liberal 
thought which highlights the transnational non-governmental ties between 
societies via communication between individuals and between groups. Second is 
the interdependence liberal thought which pays attention to the mutual exchange 
and dependence between people and governments. Third is the institutional liberal 
thought which highlights the importance of institutionalized cooperation among 
states. Last is the republican liberal thought which argues that liberal democratic 
constitutions are vital in inducing peaceful and cooperative relations among states 
(Rathus, 2011, p.25; Walt, 1998; Jackson & Sorensen, 2007, pp.100-111).  
 
2.2.1 Liberalist Based Research 
i)  Lack of Interdependence 
The integration in East Asia is not as advanced as compared to Europe. 
While Europe achieved regional integration through the legally binding regional 
institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, and the 
Council of Europe, East Asia has no legally binding multilateral regional 
institutions. Comparing the East Asian regional integration to the European 
integration, East Asia has been a market based while Europe has been a large 
regional bureaucracy centered in regional governments. Consequently, 
cooperation among national authorities are less intimate, focusing more on 
economic collision but less devoting to build a formal regional institution. 
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East Asia’s weak interdependencies in economics and in other various 
areas have stemmed from power rivalries that are deep rooted by complex 
historical antagonisms, conflicting economic systems, and political disputes. First, 
the historical antagonisms among East Asian countries with the issues of comfort 
women, history textbooks and territorial rights have disrupted the reach of a 
concrete dialogue on regional cooperation in East Asia. The controversy over the 
historical memories had sweep over the East Asia during the early 21
st
 century 
(Hasegawa & Togo, 2008). Korea, China, and other East Asian countries have 
fallen into the vicious cycle of antipathy over their bad historical memories which 
have deepened the gaps and controversies from generation to generation. 
 
The conflicting economic system and political disputes in East Asia also 
have influenced countries’ weak interdependency. Unlike the EU which has the 
apparent entrance conditions of a democratic government and market economy 
while transposing one’s national law into the EU laws, the criteria for admission 
to the East Asian regional integration is ambiguous. Dynamic economic and 
political systems have disabled concrete institutionalization. Ikenberry (2008, 
p.219) highlighted how East Asian countries have engaged with countries outside 
of region, carrying on hard and concrete bilateralism and soft multilateralism by 
involving the United States. In order to cope with conflicting economic systems 
among East Asian countries, countries have sought to integrate bilaterally rather 
than multilaterally, exacerbating the East Asian regional integration.  
 
19 
 
ii)   Domestic Approach Research 
Members of a domestic society have sought that their own interests and 
individual behaviors have channeled the social order (Moravcsik, 1992, p.7). 
Individuals have potential to converge their interests to the point where it 
represents the state, laying the foundation for international relations. However, 
linking this Liberal’s assertion to East Asia is difficult. East Asian countries have 
unique and dynamic state preferences which stemmed from each national’s 
varying preferences and divergent values. These determined East Asian countries’ 
state behaviors cannot converge easily that East Asian regional integration seems 
to be not easy.  
 
Etel Solingen noted that the nature of dominant domestic coalition 
frequently explains the origin of regional institution starts with the features of 
domestic caucus matters that begin with the creation or design institutions for 
relative power distribution (Solingen, 2008). East Asia’s high degree of diversity 
in domestic elements has disrupted East Asian regionalism. For instance, East 
Asia’s economic condition are diverse, ranging from the advanced economies to 
the poorest in the world: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea are the advanced 
capitalist economies; China and Vietnam are under the transitional state of the 
high-income nations; while Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and North Korea have 
been slow in making market reforms. Accordingly, the region could hardly meet 
the concord among nations (Wan, 2008, pp.21-22). 
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In addition, the diverse domestic political systems- democracy to Socialist- 
have substantially put the achievement of regional harmonization in a predicament. 
Robert Scalapino (1987) classified East Asian political systems into Leninist, 
authoritarian- pluralist, and liberal democratic states. Kim Yung-myung (2003) 
mentioned that the East Asian political systems cannot be as same as the Western 
ones as their democracy for instance cannot be as liberal as the Western 
democracies and that East Asian political systems are too diverse even inside the 
category of communist and democratic. For instance, China, North Korea and 
Vietnam are communistic governments characterized as Leninist, Maoist, or 
Junche; Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan are democratic countries 
while having some differences in the degree of power distribution and 
concentration in a liberal democratic institution. John Ruggie (1995) argued that 
proper coordination between domestic politics plays an important role in regional 
integration, showed in Europe and North America. However in East Asia, hybrid 
political regimes have faced difficulties in integrating Socialist China, Absolute 
Monarchy Brunei, Federal Constitutional Elective Monarchy with Federal 
Parliamentary Democracy Malaysia, Hereditary single-party state North Korea, 
and Marxist-Leninist single-party states Laos and Vietnam. 
 
2.3    Constructivism and Regionalism in East Asia 
Gaining prominence in the 1990s, constructivist ideas claimed that 
interstate relationships and decisions made by the states were shaped by the 
historical and social context rather than by the human nature (Katzenstein, 1996, 
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p.59). Constructivists identify the structure, rules, and norms of states and expect 
to read the power structure, relationships between states’ interests, and the 
prospects of changes in world politics. They believe the structure of world politics 
determines the behavior of states (Waltz, 1979, p.93). A chief proponent of social 
constructivism, Alexander Wendt has regarded shared understandings, 
expectations, or knowledge shape the structure of international relations (Wendt, 
1992, p.73). A security dilemma for instance is a social structure where states are 
so distrustful in their relations that they make bad assumptions on each other’s 
intentions and make worst assumptions on each other’s intentions (Jackson & 
Sorensen, 2007, p.165). 
 
2.3.1    Constructivist Based Research 
i)      Weak Common Identity 
In terms of unity, the group of individuals who share same beliefs and 
language under the same place are compulsory. Karl Deutsch (1957) identified the 
formation of common identity as the driving force of regional institutional 
integration. Common identity under the glaze of common culture provides a 
greater momentum to accelerate regionalism or integration in East Asia. However, 
the people in East Asia have weak common identity with diversities in religion, 
language, and ongoing interactions with outside countries. First, religion has the 
power to shape people’s idea and behaviors. The people under the same religion 
share the same beliefs and values and build common identities, which make them 
cooperative rather than conflicting with each other. In East Asia, various religions 
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have coexisted together such as Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Islam, and 
Muslim. Identities formed through the religious teachings have classified people 
and nations with different religious ideology and indoctrination. Consequently, 
East Asian nations with divergent religion can hardly meet the consensus among 
themselves with the disparity beliefs and values formed via diverse religions. 
 
The second important element in unity is language. Linguistically, East 
Asia has too many languages. East Asian languages are separated into five 
different linguistic groups such as Altaic (including Mongolian, Korean, 
Japanese), Sino-Tibetan (Chinese, Tibetan, Burmese), Tai (Thai, Lao), 
Austroasiatic (Vietnamese, Cambodian), and Austronesian (Indonesian, Filipino) 
(Miller, 2004, p.9). These five different languages groups again diffused to each 
East Asian country and those distributed languages again altered their forms 
according to their national characteristics. As a result, the language disparity in 
East Asian region has made the regional integration more difficult. 
 
Acharya (1997) and Liu (2003) mentioned that the development of 
ASEAN was possible via exploration of a common identity through shared norms 
and social structure. Members of ASEAN have evolved through diplomatic 
interactions and a practice called the ‘ASEAN Way’ which includes the non-
interference principle, informal consultation, consensus building and flexible 
incrementalism. The social process in Southeast Asia has played a significant role 
in constructing a collaborative, stable and well-organized region. Southeast Asia 
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may share the similar identity with the geographical proximity, similar languages 
and religions, but East Asia can hardly achieve the regional integration with 
diverse and very distinct identities among countries. 
 
ii)     Strong Nationalism 
Nationalism is a belief or creed that individuals attached to their countries 
thus this creates patriotism. However, there is a stronger sense of nationalism 
which is an aggressive assertion that proclaims national interest over other 
countries and an expression of the deeper sense of national identity on behalf of 
the nation (Breuilly, 1993, pp.19-21). In the case of Japan, its nationalism 
developed via solidarity of self-conceited nationality as being Japanese and thus 
the Japanese nationalism took over patriotism, formulated by the respect of its 
emperor (Nish, 1993, p.173). For instance, a strong Japanese nationalism stirred 
up when Prime Minister Nakasone made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine 
in Tokyo. His visit raised tensions and criticism from China and Korea over the 
history which caused damage to the relations with its neighbor countries. 
Consequently, Japanese nationalism, excessive national product protectionism, 
has halted Japan from having better trade relationship with foreign countries. 
Similar to Japan, China in the past up until 1911 used to have an emperor but now 
has a supreme leader who leads the country which has a strong set of nationalism 
that originated from patriotism. Unlike European countries where reached the 
European integration by overcoming regional countries’ nationalistic sentiments, 
East Asian countries could not reach the East Asian integration due to countries’ 
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relentlessly strong nationalistic sentiments. East Asian countries have not wanted 
outside powers to influence or interfere their national affairs. As a result, East 
Asia has yet to implement a concrete regional institution. 
 
2.4   Critical Assessment of Past Literature 
The past literature had raised many factors that caused the slow progress 
of East Asian regionalism. They analysed the correlation between regional 
cooperation and state actors, alliance, domestic influence, and social identity. 
Many scholars have explained very well regarding the causes that disrupted the 
regionalism in East Asia. However, this thesis argues beyond the past approaches 
that explained the causes of slow progress in East Asian regional integration, there 
is one missing factor that needs to be looked up- the lukewarm relationship 
between Japan and South Korea.  
 
Among the overviewed theories that explain international relations, this 
research is based on the realist approach. Explaining international relations in 
terms of power, how one country exercise power toward the other, I believed it 
can explain the slow progress of East Asian regional integration most 
appropriately. However, past realist approaches also had some problems of 
focusing just on the great powers like the US, China and Japan. In some policy 
areas, the involvement of middle power like South Korea is also important that 
this research investigated South Korea’s role in East Asian regional integration. 
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Liberalism and Constructivism approaches gave explanations of the slow 
progress in East Asian regional integration. Liberalism, which explained the 
problems of achieving a deep integration in East Asia with interdependence 
theory and domestic approach, failed. East Asian countries are lack of 
interdependencies due to their historical antagonism, complex economic system, 
political disputes, and a high degree of diversity in domestic politics. However, 
European countries, for instance, have formed regional integration by overcoming 
lack of interdependence stemmed from member countries’ rivalry and domestic 
political differences. 
 
Constructivism highlighted East Asian countries’ weak common identities 
and strong nationalism as serious impediments to East Asian regional integration. 
However, the EU and the NATO are two completed regional integration, which 
are the aggregations of different cultures, people, strong sense of nationalism 
originated from long years of animosity. Europeans have deeply attached to the 
strong national identities in terms of minority problem.
4
 Relationships between 
dominant and minority groups had differences in races, nationalities and religions. 
The complex relations between minority and dominant groups could have been 
more serious and severe than the tensions between East Asian countries. 
Moreover, European countries’ strong national identities did not guarantee 
                                                          
4
 “Group of people who are held together by ties of common descent, physical characteristics, 
sexual preference, traditions, customs, language, or religion, or any combination of these, and who, 
in relation to some other group with which they are associated, occupy a subordinate status 
(Colliers Encyclopedia, 1994, p.336)”  (Cocodia, 2010, pp. 62-63). 
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European community. However, Europe overcame and achieved the integration 
while East Asian countries make real slow progress in regional integration.  
 
Liberalism and Constructivism arguments are very important, but the 
complete integrations of American and European countries verified the weakness 
of these theories. As a result, this thesis believes the Realist Power Politics 
including South Korea explains the present East Asian regional integration 
process most excellently.  
 
Most past literatures have usually omitted South Korea’s important role in 
the process of East Asia integration. Former East Asian regional studies normally 
had more interests in investigating China-Japan relationship rather than examining 
Japan-Korea relationship. However, this thesis will demonstrate the significance 
of South Korea in establishing East Asian regionalism by construing the meaning 
of the key actors in East Asian regionalism differently. This thesis believes, 
beyond the important China-Japan relations, Japan and South Korea are the only 
two economically advanced countries in East Asia that can solve the challenges in 
East Asian regional integration. Once they coordinate with each other and take the 
lead in regional dialogue, the two countries can co-initiate the regional integration, 
by helping and motivating other East Asian countries to join the regional 
integration process. 
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2.5    Research Questions and Assumptions 
From scholars past studies on regionalism in East Asia and my criticism 
on the literature, this thesis will address the following two interrelated empirical 
questions: 
 
Firstly, why East Asian regionalism has shown a slow progress? 
Secondly, why Japan and South Korea have been unable to make 
coordination on extended regionalism in East Asia? 
 
By arguing that the lack of coordination or the weak coexistence between 
Japan and South Korea has directly disrupted the East Asian regionalism’s steady 
progress, this thesis made two assumptions on the factors that have unable 
extended regionalism in East Asia. First is two countries’ rivalry; second is Japan 
and South Korea’s difference in the target of interstate cooperation. 
 
In this thesis, the term rivalry refers to a country’s unpleasant feeling 
toward the other country which has potential to threaten one’s interests, positions 
and goals. Under the relative scarcity and overlapping interests and goals, one will 
gain while the other loses. However, unlike the original meaning of rivalry which 
two powers fight to maximize their goals, the rivalry in this thesis does not have 
to be a bilateral or mutual competition or conflicts. While one nation rivals the 
other nation, the latter nation does not necessarily have to rival the first nation.  
28 
 
The term difference in the target of interstate cooperation signifies Japan 
and South Korea’s major interest parties. Thus, interstate cooperation has no 
restrictions in the number of states and the range of areas of the states. 
 
This thesis assumes, first, regarding the two countries’ rivalry, Japan rivals 
China. Japan’s rivalry toward China emerged when China’s economy and 
influence grew significantly while Japan remained stagnant. Japan has concerned 
China’s ambition to take the regional leadership that Japan has focused on China’s 
movements in East Asian region. China’s desires to take the supremacy in 
Southeast Asia turned Japan’s interests to Southeast Asia over South Korea (Ott, 
2005). Consequently, Japan concluded various forms of relationships with 
Southeast Asian countries to lower Chinese influence in Southeast Asia while 
suspending the cooperation with South Korea (Bilateral, 2012). Second, South 
Korea rivals Japan. Both Japan and South Korea have shared similar foreign 
policy objectives in maintaining a close relationship with the US and identical 
economic markets (Lo, 2013). As a result, South Korea has rivaled Japan, causing 
weak or no coordination between two countries. 
 
Second, regarding the difference in the target of interstate cooperation, this 
thesis hypothesizes that Japan has interests in Southeast Asia or East Asia in a 
broad sense while South Korea has its interest in Northeast Asia or the global 
setting. When tracing Japan’s foreign policy toward East Asian countries, Japan 
has paid special attention to Southeast Asian countries. Japan sparked its 
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relationship with ASEAN by way of supporting ASEAN member countries’ 
infrastructure and human resource development. Since then, they have maintained 
close relationships. Japan gradually deepened its cooperation with ASEAN 
member countries, concluding bilateral FTAs with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia 
and the Philippines and a FTA with ASEAN entity. Through the literature review, 
Japan’s efforts to strengthen ties with ASEAN are to exit from its economic 
stagnation and deflation; maintain a strong power compatible to China and hold 
the regional leadership (Yoshimatsu, 2008). In case of South Korea, compared to 
other powerful nations in East Asia, it has shown little interest and put less effort 
in building an East Asian regionalism (MOFAT, 2003). However, this does not 
mean that South Korea does not have any interest in East Asian countries, but 
South Korea has shown great interests in North East Asian countries or other 
external countries. South Korea has maintained sound relations with Japan and 
China, Northeast Asian countries (MOFA, 2013a; Snyder & Byun, 2013). Korea 
often has interdependent and warm relations with Japan in trades while having 
continuously improving relations with China in trade. Furthermore, South Korea 
has eagerly cooperated with the US and the EU. Korea is one of the affluent and 
strong countries in the world, but in the East Asian context, South Korea turns 
into a relatively limited power projection country. Between China and Japan, two 
superpowers, South Korea has needed superior powers like the US and the EU to 
cover its relative vulnerability (Cooper et al., 2011). Accordingly, South Korea 
puts efforts to maintain good relations with the US and the EU while maintaining 
warm relations with China and Japan concurrently. 
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2.6    Research Methodology 
In the framework of this thesis, there are three sources of data that have 
explored how Japan and South Korea’s relationship can contribute to the slow 
progress of East Asian regionalism. 
 
First, I could use the database of the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of 
Economies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Korea Environment Institute via 
their respective websites. Moreover, I visited the National Assembly Library and 
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) and accessed the official 
documents and publications. Second, I made use of secondary sources such as 
books, book chapters and journals related to Japan-South Korea relations and 
regional integration in East Asia. Third, I interviewed scholars and professors who 
specialize in the fields of environment and trade. I also received advice from the 
EANET specialist who is the member of the EANET Science Advisory Council. 
Moreover, I interviewed a FTA deputy director who specializes in East Asian 
region. 
 
This thesis highlights how Japan and South Korea’s commitments have 
contributed to the development of East Asian regionalism with two case studies of 
trade (FTA) and air pollution (EANET) having two analytical frameworks of 
rivalry and difference in  the  target of interstate cooperation. 
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 First, trade cooperation through FTAs is a proper case for an analysis of 
policy coordination between Japan and South Korea, who are two advanced 
nations, can gain the most by the formation of the FTAs worldwide. Furthermore, 
the FTA issue has gradually become significant in Japanese and Korean policies 
with drastic changes in the international community by the relative decline of the 
US while the rise of China. In this situation, they should have cooperated in 
promoting trade regionalism. Second, air pollution is suitable to show Japan and 
South Korea’s commitment to the development in East Asian regionalism as they 
are the only two technologically advanced countries who can provide the 
technologies to resolve air pollution problems. Moreover, they are the two 
representatives suffering from air pollutants from China. In this environment, they 
expect to cooperate in order to mitigate the negative impact of air pollution from 
China. 
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CHAPTER 3: JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA’S INFLUNECE ON TRADE 
REGIONALISM 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) refers to an agreement which eliminates 
tariffs, imports quotas, and offers preferences on most goods and services for 
signed member countries. The signed countries can enter into the legally binding 
commitments on free access to each other’s markets for goods and services. FTA 
has supported trade liberalization across the globe by linking two or more 
countries to exchange goods and services and providing an optimum circumstance 
to fulfil countries’ economic interests. In 1990, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) reported 27 FTAs, and it creased to 421 in 2008 (Matsushita, 
2010). In the present, more than 90% of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
members participate in FTAs (WTO, 2013). 
 
The rapid FTA intensification occurred in the 1990s, beginning from the 
European countries. European countries were at the forefront of this agreement. 
Twenty-seven European countries have moved toward the great economic 
integration by eliminating all the obstruction factors in production and trade and 
even became a common market. Beyond their internal free trade, forming the 
European Union (EU), the European countries have had FTAs with other 
countries around the world. After the establishment of the EU, North American 
countries moved toward FTA activities in January 1992. In 1994, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect via the collaboration 
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of Canada, Mexico, and the US, creating one of the world’s largest free trade 
zones and delivering substantial economic growth and prosperity (USTR, 2013). 
 
Inspired by the development of the EU and the NAFTA, East Asia also 
adopted the export-led economic growth model and took off FTA activities. Since 
the late 1990s, the East Asian economies showed the intensive zeal in formulating 
FTAs. At First, East Asian countries courted FTA partners from inside the region. 
Began from 1998, Japan and South Korea took off the initial FTA activity in East 
Asia. This became the initial catalyst for the FTA trend in East Asia. Soon after 
the Japan-Korea FTA proposal, quick responses from other East Asian countries 
were aroused, searching for various FTA formations through bilateral and 
multilateral FTAs with regional trade partners as well as outside trade partners. 
 
Proposed in 2010, the East Asia economies had concluded 50 FTAs with 
43 FTAs under negotiation and 32 FTAs (Zhang & Shen, 2011, pp.6-8). The 
proliferation of FTAs has been extremely rapid. Within three years, the number of 
FTA conclusion increased from Singapore, South Korea, China, and Thailand 
negotiated 35, 26, 25, and 24 FTAs in 2010 to 32, 27, and 29 FTAs in 2013(ADB, 
2012).  
 
Regardless of these substantial FTA engagements and proliferation in East 
Asia and negotiations have going on via the Japan-Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), none of these have developed into a solid East Asian 
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economic integration. Moreover, some FTA proposals did not meet good 
conclusions. Notably, the proposal of Japan-Korea FTA has remained to be long 
resisted. The idea of Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (JKFTA) was introduced 
by Japan in November 1998. At the start of negotiation, both countries showed 
positivity in their economic cooperation and the JKFTA formation, but in the 
latter half of the talks, they faced difficulties. This is due to a fact that the two 
countries where undergo a FTA negotiation has a different amount of economic 
resources and political influence. One country may get advantage while the other 
get disadvantage. This gain and loss relation applied to Japan and Korea’s relation. 
The position of South Korea was relatively vulnerable in the bilateral trade 
negotiation. Korea had a lower bargaining power which helped Japan to impose 
favourable conditions but unfavorable to South Korea. Accordingly, South Korea 
was reluctant to conclude JKFTA. Meanwhile, Japan also decided to concentrate 
more on strengthening the FTAs with ASEAN to check the rise of China rather 
than proceeding JKFTA. This Japan and South Korea’s entangled relations have 
also influenced the establishment of the East Asia wide FTA. The stalled Japan-
Korea FTA proposal was mainly due to Japan and South Korea’s rivalry factors 
and different scope of regional interests. These impediments to the establishment 
of the JKFTA have also caused the challenges to the emergence of a regional 
economic integration. 
 
In this chapter, by giving two concrete cases of the JKFTA and an East 
Asia wide FTA, it will show how Japan and South Korea’s rivalry and difference 
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in the target of interstate cooperation have influenced the development of regional 
economic integration in East Asia. Firstly, Japan and South Korea’s rivalries refer 
to two countries’ different directions of rivalry, implying Japan’s rivalry to China 
and South Korea’s rivalry to Japan. Japan has competed China over the East 
Asian leadership which made Japan not to concentrate on the JKFTA but made it 
keep its eyes on China’s movement and China’s negotiating partners, mainly 
ASEAN. Unlike Japan, South Korea has rivaled Japan with a sense of 
vulnerability. Secondly, the differences in the target of interstate cooperation 
signify Japan’s target in an East Asia wide interstate cooperation while South 
Korea has targeted both Northeast Asia and global interstate cooperation. 
 
3.2  FTA Development in East Asia 
3.2.1  Bilateral FTAs in East Asia 
Bilateral free trade agreement is a negotiation between two countries, 
regarded as a stepping stone to full integration into the global market. Many 
governments have signed bilateral FTAs, and most of the Asian countries are also 
pursuing bilateral FTAs. First, in case of Southeast Asian countries, bilateral 
agreements were fostered within Southeast Asia and between ASEAN and 
countries outside the region. Among Southeast Asian countries, Brunei, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam had agreed to eliminate tariffs within themselves, and ASEAN as an 
entity also has concluded various agreements with other nations (ASEAN, 2012b). 
In January 2004, ASEAN signed the comprehensive economic partnership with 
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China; with South Korea in November 2007; with Japan in December 2008; and 
with India in January 2010 ([Table 3-1]). Moreover, individually, Singapore had 
signed FTAs with New Zealand, Japan, Australia, the US, European Free Trade 
Association and Jordan. Thailand signed agreements with the US, New Zealand, 
Australia, China, Japan, etc. Malaysia and the US agreed to a framework for a 
bilateral agreement in May 2004, negotiated on a Closer Economic Partnership 
with Japan, and completed a bilateral FTA with Australia (Khor, 2005). 
 
Second, Northeast Asian countries, beginning with China, the Chinese 
government believed a FTA as a pathway to speed up domestic reforms by 
opening up to the global economy and reinforcing economic cooperation with 
other economies. As a result, China has presently 14 FTA partners embracing 31 
economies, and among them, it concluded 8 agreements. The partners are ASEAN, 
Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Hong Kong, Macau, Costa Rica, 
Iceland, Switzerland, Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia, and Norway (Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce, 2013). The government of Japan has also sought to 
promote high-level economic partnerships with major economies that as of July 
2013, it had concluded 13 FTAs (or Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)), 
and 10 FTAs are under negotiations (MOFA, 2013b). Currently, FTAs with 
Singapore, Mexico, Malaysia, Chile, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, ASEAN, 
Philippines, Switzerland, Vietnam, India, and Peru entered into force (MOFA, 
2013b). Furthermore, the Korean government, since the establishment of the FTA 
Roadmap in 2003, has actively pursued FTAs with key trading partners. Until 
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now, the Korean government concluded FTAs with Chile, Singapore, European 
Free Trade Association, ASEAN, India and Peru, the EU and the US (MOFAT, 
2013b). 
 
[Table 3-1] Bilateral Free Trade Agreement in East Asia (as of July 2012) 
Name Effective Date Name Effective Date 
ASEAN Free Trade Area  
New Zealand-Singapore 
Japan-Singapore 
Singapore-Australia 
ASEAN-China 
China-Macao 
China-Hong Kong 
Thailand-Australia 
Thailand-New Zealand 
India-Singapore 
Korea-Singapore 
Japan-Malaysia 
Korea-ASEAN 
Japan-Thailand 
1/28/1992 
1/1/2001 
11/30/2002 
7/28/2003 
1/1/2004 
1/1/2004 
1/1/2004 
1/1/2005 
7/1/2005 
8/1/2005 
3/2/2006 
7/13/2006 
6/1/2007 
11/1/2007 
Japan-Indonesia 
Japan-Brunei 
China-New Zealand 
Japan-ASEAN 
Japan-Philippines 
China-Singapore 
Japan-Vietnam 
ASEAN-Australia/NZ 
ASEAN-India 
India-Korea 
Malaysia-New Zealand 
Hong Kong-New Zealand 
India-Malaya 
Japan-India 
7/1/2008 
7/31/2008 
10/1/2008 
12/1/2008 
12/11/2008 
1/1/2009 
10/1/2009 
1/1/2010 
1/1/2010 
1/1/2010 
8/1/2010 
1/1/2011 
7/1/2011 
8/1/2011 
Source: Complied by the author from data on the WTO website (WTO, 2013).  
 
The East Asian economies were encouraged to open up their economies 
through bilateral FTAs. However the progress of FTAs between Northeast Asia is 
slow. An unofficial study on China-Korea FTA (CKFTA) was declared in 2004, 
and research on the feasibility of the CKFTA drew a conclusion that the FTA 
would be mutually beneficial (Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2013). However, 
the two countries have had a slow progress in solving conflicting issues. 
Moreover, both China and Japan and Japan and South Korea have not seemed to 
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realize the importance of launching FTAs among them. Japan’s rivalry sentiment 
towards China made Japan prioritize the bilateral FTAs with East Asian countries, 
especially ASEAN. Moreover, while Japan criticized China’s aggressive attempts 
to carry on FTAs with ASEAN in November 2000, Japan soon signed the 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) (Taniguchi, 2004, 
p.26). Japan could not leave China and ASEAN to deliberate the negotiation of 
ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA). Japan’s bilateral FTA orientation was from the 
strategy of a soft balancing against China, constructing stronger trade links with 
Southeast Asia (Munakata, 2006; Ravenhill, 2010). In addition, South Korea’s 
rivalry sentiment toward Japan made South Korea prioritize the United States, 
European Union, and other major economic powers outside of the East Asian 
region. The Countries with different rivalries and differences of interests have 
hindered Northeast Asian countries from concluding the FTAs among them. 
Namely, regardless of several bilateral FTA commitments made by Northeast 
Asian countries, there still is no FTA that effective and this implies the difficulty 
of further East Asian regional integration. 
  
The relationship between China and Japan has been strained because of 
the rise of China and the decline of Japan. China ranks number two in the world 
economy, but Japan still maintains the pre-eminence in the economics of industry, 
technology and finance in Asia. Japan is still resilient in maintaining a supreme 
power in East Asia while China has put efforts to catch up Japan. This rivalry 
relationship between China and Japan has universally mapped out by other 
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scholars. Therefore, this thesis expects to examine more about Japan and South 
Korea’s rivalry relation and how their rivalries have influenced the advancement 
of regional trade integration in East Asia.  
 
Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (JKFTA) 
 Japan brought the idea of the JKFTA in November 1998 and a month after 
President Kim Dae-Jung’s official visit to Japan in which he termed as 
forgiveness and reconciliation, expecting closer bilateral relations between two 
countries (Hatch, 2004, p.91). President Kim’s visit was the first time when a 
leader from South Korea had visited since March 1994. The Korean side proposed 
cooperation in the economy, security and cultural exchange (Munakata, 2001, 
p.15). Consequently, Japan and South Korea positively promoted the 
enhancement of the Japan-Korean bilateral relationships and carried out studies 
and consultations via the Joint Study Group (Kim, 2000, p.2).
5
 The Joint Study 
Group anticipated a wide range of benefits from the JKFTA (MOFA, 2003, p.3). 
 
The overall economic effects of the JKFTA – the intra-industry trades, 
win-win cooperation and competition between companies and high benefits – 
placed six rounds of the JKFTA talks from October 2003 to November 2004. The 
first round of the talk was from Seoul on December 22, 2003. Both countries 
agreed on basic principles, structures, and scope of negotiations. The second 
round was from Seoul on April 26 to 28. In this round five negotiation groups – 
                                                          
5
 The Joint Study Group was composed of representatives from two countries’ governments as 
well as business and academic scholars in order to evaluate the likelihood of launching the JKFTA.  
40 
 
trade in goods; trade in services and investment; non-tariff measures, as well as 
Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and other trade-related issues and cooperation – discussed mutual issues 
that interfere the agreement. The third round was from Seoul on April 26 to 28 in 
2004, holding seven negotiation group meetings. The fourth round was from 
Tokyo on Jun 23 to 25, 2004; fifth round was from Kyongju on August 23 to 25, 
discussing how to pave the way in negotiating tariff elimination. The last round 
was from Tokyo on November 1
 
to 3, 2004. Throughout the six rounds of 
negotiations, regardless of many issues were dealt, such as the matter of trade in 
goods, investment, trade in services, but the JKFTA became discontinued (MOFA, 
2003). 
 
[Table 3-2] The Progress of the JKFTA 
Nov. 1998 Japan and South Korea agreed to conduct a joint research on a feasibility 
of a FTA which presented during two countries’ ministerial meeting 
Dec. 1998 – Apr. 
2000 
Japan and South Korea conducted a joint research through Korea Institute 
for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and Institute of Developing 
Economies (IDE) 
- May 24, 2000 Meeting in Seoul and Tokyo 
Nov.23, 2000 At the summit, they agreed on the initiation of “Korea-Japan FTA 
Business Forum” to collect the opinions of direct FTA stakeholders 
Mar. 2001 – Jan. 
2002 
A Korea-Japan Business Forum was held and the Joint Declaration to 
promote Japan-Korea FTA was presented as an early stage of 
comprehensive economic partnership 
Jul. 2002 – Dec. 
2003 
Governmental Joint Study on a Korea-Japan FTA was held for six times 
Oct. 2003 They both agreed to initiate FTA negotiation by 2003 and terminate the 
FTA negotiation by 2005  
Dec. 2003 The first FTA negotiation was held which meetings would be held every 
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two months 
Nov. 2004 The sixth FTA negotiation was held and no meetings were held after this 
meeting 
Dec. 2004 The Japanese side wanted to renegotiation during the Korea-Japan summit. 
Japan proposed the conclusion of the FTA by 2005 but South Korea turned 
down the renegotiation 
Jun. 2005 Japan wanted a prompt resolution on Korea-Japan FTA renegotiation but 
Korea has made excuses by mentioning its domestic policies 
Oct. 2006 Japan wanted to accelerate the Korea-Japan FTA negotiation. However 
Korea was neutral on the matter  
Jul. 2007 In the ministerial-level economic discussion, ideas were exchanged on 
promoting renegotiations 
Feb. 2008 The Japanese side proposed preliminary discussions which the two 
countries agreed to resume the renegotiations 
Apr.2008 They both agreed to reconsider to review and consult about the Korea-
Japan FTA 
Jun.2008 The 1
st
 mid-level consultation on examining an appropriate solution for the 
Korea-Japan FTA renegotiations (@Tokyo) 
Dec.2008 The 2nd mid-level consultation on examining an appropriate solution for 
the Korea-Japan FTA renegotiations (@Seoul) 
Jul. 2009 The 3rd mid-level consultation on examining an appropriate solution for 
the Korea-Japan FTA renegotiations (@Tokyo) 
Dec. 2009 The 4th mid-level consultation on examining an appropriate solution for 
the Korea-Japan FTA renegotiations (@Seoul) 
Nov. 2010 The 1
st
 Korea-Japan FTA low-level consultation (@Tokyo) 
May. 2011 The 2
nd
 Korea-Japan FTA low-level consultation (@Seoul) 
Source: Korea Japan Cooperation Foundation (KJCF) (2009) & Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(MITI) (2013). 
 
Japan and South Korea re-initiated the EPA negotiations on December 
2003. However, on November 2004, at the 6
th
 summit talks, the JKFTA 
negotiations broke down with confrontation in agriculture product tariffs. South 
Korea excessively required the liberalization of Japan’s sensitive agricultural 
products, calling for the liberalization over 90% of Japan’s agricultural products 
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(Nakajima, 2007, p.148). Japan could not accept the request. Moreover, Japanese 
significantly lower tariffs on goods than South Korean tariffs were expected to 
arouse Korea’s trade deficits. Two countries confronted with difficulties in 
adjusting tariffs and adjusting expected trade deficits, and they eventually failed 
the JKFTA. 
 
Moreover, two countries’ piled up competitive major items which were 
raised as the reasons for halting the further JKFTA talks. Japan’s three major 
export items were electronics (31.4%), precision instruments (22%), and 
automobiles (18.6%), whereas Korea’s top three were electronics (39.7%), textiles 
(10.7%), and automobiles (8.9%). Korea and Japan are competing in the US 
market on export items such as computers, semiconductors, wireless 
communication devices, home appliances, automobiles, steel, rubber, and tires 
(Cheong, 2001a, p.26). 
 
As the JKFTA failed, the East Asia economic integration has been slow in 
progress. The JKFTA could have served as a channel to create a deeper 
integration in the region and embarked the East Asia FTA (EAFTA) and a 
trilateral FTA among China, Japan and Korea (MOFA, 2003, p.22). Unfortunately, 
the stoppage of the JKFTA failed to establish an exemplary model for the East 
Asia economic integration and worsen two countries’ relationships. The Joint 
Study Group of the JKFTA noted that the JKFTA should aspire to be a perfect 
role model for other East Asian regional economic integrations by achieving high-
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levels of liberalization in all sectors. If the FTAs in East Asian region shared a 
greater degree of likeness than contrast, East Asian countries could have easily 
affiliated into a greater regional FTA. To this conclusion, the JKFTA should make 
a greater effect to persuade to future discussions in pursuing FTAs in the East 
Asian region (MOFA, 2003, p.22). 
 
3.2.2  Multilateral FTAs in East Asia 
In this section, this thesis will look beyond the obstacles in bilateral FTAs. 
This thesis will take a look at the multilateral FTA in East Asia which is the basis 
for economic integration in the region. Bilateral FTAs have helped East Asian 
countries to progress in economic liberalization, but in order to launch the better 
access to foreign markets and better gains, a further operation was needed. The 
best route to this process was via multilateral trade agreements. Multilateral trade 
agreements referred to the regulatory trade agreement involving three or more 
countries where wish to regulate trade between nations by removing tariffs and 
other barriers in opening commerce. Multilateral FTAs have sought to help 
several participant countries to gain more economic and security benefits from 
each other. The EU and the NAFTA are two major multilateral FTAs. These 
agreements were considered to be the most effective ways of liberalizing trades in 
an interdependent global economy. 
 
Since the 1990s, most East Asian countries concluded bilateral and mini-
lateral FTAs and they experienced tremendous economic benefits originated from 
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them. They were able to increase the market access of goods and services to form 
larger integrated market, and cope with unexpected problems cooperatively (Chia, 
2010, pp.33-34). As a result, East Asian states sought to conclude the multilateral 
FTA with the expectation of installing larger market zone with the larger members 
and gaining greater economic benefits than from bilateral or mini-lateral FTAs. 
 
An East Asia wide FTA was first proposed by the East Asia Vision Group 
at ASEAN + 3 Summit in October 2001.
6
 The talk on a region-wide FTA 
formation became regularized by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 2003. Wen 
Jiabao proposed the practicality of a free trade area in the East Asian region at the 
2003 ASEAN +3 Summit. In 2004, Wen’s proposal of EAFTA was approved. 
The EAFTA was a dialogue between ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian 
nations of China, Japan, and South Korea. Establishment of EAFTA was raised 
first in November 2000, at the ASEAN plus Three summit held in Singapore, and 
EAFTA was formulated according to the report submitted by the East Asian 
Vision Group (EAVG) in October 2001 in Brunei (EAVG, 2001). The proposal of 
the EAFTA establishment was to realize the regional trade integration which is in 
between ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and Northeast Asian Free Trade Area. 
China proposed this attainable scheme to form an East Asia regional community.  
2006, the report of EAFTA, the outcome of four rounds of meeting from April 
2005 to July 2006, was accepted (ASEAN, 2009, p. 12). 
                                                          
6
 The leaders of Japan, China and Korea were invited to the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in 
December 1997, amid of the Asian financial crisis, and initiated the ASEAN+3 process. Within 
the ASEAN+3 framework, foreign affairs, economy and trade, environment, energy, technology, 
and many other ministerial level works are preceded. 
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In 2007, leaders welcomed the outcome of the group’s study and accepted 
South Korea’s proposal to conduct the phase II study involving the in-depth, 
sector-by-sector analysis of the EAFTA (ASEAN, 2009, p.53).
7
 Since the EAFTA 
framework was set via agreements which it was considered to be the most 
plausible regional cooperation in the trade sector by ASEAN+3 ministers from 
different parts of the government. Along with the Chinese initiative of EAFTA, 
the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed the idea of initiating a private-
level study on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in East Asia 
(CEPEA) in 2006. The East Asian Economic Ministers met and agreed that 
experts would examine the concept of the CEPEA. The CEPEA includes 16 
countries of the East Asia Summit – ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South 
Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand – with the motivation of increasing the 
economic growth by launching a larger regional market. The CEPEA covered a 
wider range of trade issues such as trades in goods, services, investment, and 
intellectual property rights. The group aimed to strengthen industrial 
competitiveness of the region by promoting the formation of efficient production 
networks. 
 
In 2009, at the fourth East Asian Summit, officials were tasked to consider 
the recommendations and studies of EAFTA and CEPEA. In August 2011, China 
and Japan together proposed the formation of a regional FTA in East Asia at the 
EAS Economic Minister meeting. Leaders agreed on the joint proposal by China 
                                                          
7
 The EAFTA Study Phase II was carried out to find the feasibility of EAFTA, to promote in-depth 
sector by sector analysis and studies, and to hold the initiative in the discussion of regional 
integration in East Asia by South Korea (Lee, 2008). 
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and Japan for establishing the three working groups for trade and investment 
liberalization. In November 2011, ASEAN ended the debate by proposing its own 
model for an ASEAN-centered regional FTA – the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) (DFAT, 2012). RCEP signified the assurance of 
negotiation in the areas of trade in goods, trade in services, and investment on a 
regional level. RCEP was approved at the 19
th
 ASEAN Summit in November 
2011 and was based on “ASEAN++” formula which was seen as either favoring 
China’s initiative of EAFTA or supporting Japan’s initiative of CEPEA. Its aim 
was to achieve the comprehensive and beneficial regional economic integration. 
RCEP membership is based on the open accession, enabling any of economic 
partners to join. RCEP covers trade in goods, trade in services, investment, 
economic, technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, dispute 
settlement and other issues (MITI, 2012). 
  
The spread of multilateral FTAs in East Asia is in slow progress regardless 
of several attempts by many countries in the region. Countries are confronted with 
the confusion over the direction and the feasibility of integration. East Asian 
countries confused over the suitability of EAFTA and CEPEA as a single East 
Asia-wide FTA and after they were initiated, they soon were consolidated into an 
ASEAN-led East Asia FTA architecture called RCEP due to the excessive 
competition over the initiative. 
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3.3  Japan and FTA Networks in East Asia 
3.3.1  Japan’s Overall FTA Policies 
In the late 1990s, Japanese economy promoted the liberalization of trade 
and domestic structural reform by using the help of external powers such as the 
United States and the GATT, the WTO, and so on. Japan succeeded in becoming 
one of the richest countries in the world within a short period of time. However, 
after the early 1990s, when the bubble and the Asia financial crisis hit Japan and 
Japan could not recovery and return to economic growth. Therefore, in order to 
improve its competitiveness, Japan decided to expand its business in overseas 
market by conducting FTAs.  
 
Japan initiated a FTA with Singapore in November 2002 and the official 
name of the agreement between Japan and Singapore was the Japan-Singapore 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA). JSEPA symbolized a change in long-
standing policy of pursuing trade liberalization only in a multilateral framework 
based on the WTO and APEC (Kawai & Wignaraja, 2007, p.6). The Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) framework included the elements of free trade 
agreement but taking into account participating countries’ economic levels and 
sensitive sectors (Yoshimatsu, 2010, p.403). Japanese comprehensive EPA not 
only eliminated tariff and nontariff barriers between the signatories but also direct 
investment liberalization, facilitation of trade, and direct investment activities, but 
also promoted economic and technical cooperation in various fields, such as 
human resource, cultivating small and medium-sized business promotion (Urata, 
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2009, p.47).
8
 Japan firmly deemed an EPA was greater than a FTA as it would 
benefit to promote the overall reform of economic structure by targeting broad 
area and it expected a weak and incomplete FTA containing special consideration 
for its sensitive sectors (Yoshimatsu, 2010, p.403; Sally, 2006, p.315). 
 
In March 2004, Japan concluded a FTA with Mexico and finalized the 
discussion on a FTA with Malaysia on the same year. Along with the FTA 
negotiation with Mexico, negotiations for the JKFTA took a place. Furthermore, 
the bilateral FTAs between Japan and the Philippines in 2006, Indonesia in 2007, 
Chile in 2007, Thailand in 2007, Brunei in 2007, ASEAN as a whole in 2008, 
Vietnam in 2008, Switzerland in 2009, India in 2011 and Peru in 2011 were 
completed (Bilateral, 2012). As shown in [Table 3-3], East Asia nations are the 
potential partners of Japan’s FTAs and Japan investigated the possibility of 
concluding FTAs with other countries not listed above, including Chile, Australia, 
India, New Zealand, and Canada. 
 
[Table 3-3] Japan’s FTA Propulsion Status (February 10, 2013 standard) 
progress Country Negotiation period Entry into Force 
Take effect Singapore 2001.01 – 2002.01 2002. 11.30 
Mexico 2002.11 – 2004.9 2005. 04. 01 
Singapore (amending) 2002.11 – 2004.11 2007. 09. 02 
Malaysia 2004.01 – 2005.12 2006. 07. 13 
Philippines 2005.02 – 2006.09 2008. 12. 11 
Thailand 2005.02 – 2007.03 2007. 11. 01 
ASEAN 2005.04 – 2008.04 2008. 12. 01 
                                                          
8
 Chinese government has viewed the Japanese proposal of EPA as a ploy to win leadership in East 
Asia (Wan, 2008, p.366) 
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Indonesia 2005.07 – 2007.08 2008. 07. 01 
Chile 2006.02 – 2007.03 2007. 09. 03 
Brunei Darussalam 2006.06 – 2007.06 2008. 07. 31 
Switzerland 2007.01 – 2009.02 2009. 09. 01 
Vietnam 2007.01 – 2008.12 2009. 10. 01 
India 2007.02 – 2010.09 2011. 02.15 
Peru 2009.05 – 2010.11 2011. 05. 31 
On 
negotiation 
 
 
 
Australia 2007.04 –   
GCC 2006.09 –   
Republic of Korea 2003.12 – 2004.11 
2008.04 –  
 
Mongolia 2011.11 –  
Canada 2012.12 –  
On 
preparation 
 
Colombia   
European Union   
Turkey   
Source: Referred to the material of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) (2013). 
3.3.2  Japan’s Preferences for the JKFTA 
Japan selected South Korea as its third FTA candidate and Japan had 
evaluated South Korea as one of the most appropriate FTA partners for three 
reasons. Firstly, the conclusion of a FTA with South Korea was a proper way to 
settle overheated competition in import markets. As of 2000, two of three major 
items of Japan and Korea were competing with each other in global markets: 
Japan’s three export items were electronics (31.4%), precision instruments (22%), 
and automobiles (18.6%) whereas Koreas’ top three were electronics (39.7%), 
textiles (10.7%), and automobiles (8.9%) and thus electronics and automobiles 
were under a heavy competition (Rhyu & Lee, 2006). The Joint Study Group 
came to the conclusion that it is important to strengthen cooperation between the 
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competition authorities of the two countries which have fought to maximize their 
benefits from competing same exports products. The two countries’ electronics, 
general machinery, transport equipment and parts were the common exporting 
goods. Since Japan was superior over Korea’s goods, it had a less difficulty in 
opening its market and forming a FTA with South Korea.  
 
Secondly, Japan’s prolonged period of economic stagnation which Japan 
needed someone to help to recover. Following the experience of economical and 
industrial development and growth, during the early 1990s, however, Japan 
plunged into recession and still suffers from a continuous economic stagnation. 
Japan anticipated that the JKFTA would grow and secure Japan’s export market 
as South Korea’s import market had been very receptive and dependent on 
Japanese goods (Okuda, 2002, p.167).  
 
Thirdly, Japan expected to transform the full-set industrial structure 
which produces all products by itself into the high value-added industrial structure. 
One country could concentrate on one part of specialized production and hand 
over the other specialized production to the other country. For instance, South 
Korea has highly depended on Japan with the intermediate exporting goods that 
Japan made the intermediate goods only while South Korea produced sale 
products. Or prioritize two countries’ competitive goods, for example, Japan 
produces wired devices, machinery, precision instruments, steal, and metals where 
its products had competitiveness while South Korea prioritizes its competitive 
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sectors of clothing and fabric (Chung, 2001). Consequently, the JKFTA would 
enable both countries to make the most from their abilities which would maximize 
the mutual profits in the global market.  
 
Despite Japan’s substantial interests in the JKFTA, negotiations were 
suspended. There was a critical political reason for the suspension of the JKFTA. 
After launching a formal negotiation for the JKFTA at the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in October 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi 
visited Yasukuni Shrine in 2004. His visit caused political tensions between South 
Korea and Japan and stalled the JKFTA talks. While the talk was stopped, Japan’s 
bureaucratic politics, METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) and 
MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries), proposed for the regional 
oriented economic partnership agreement rather than promoted the JKFTA 
(Pangestu & Song, 2007, p.93). METI felt Japan’s leadership was criticized by 
China but METI hoped to show Japan’s headship through a regional FTA. Japan’s 
bureaucrats thought they first of all needed to initiate the regional oriented FTA to 
check China rather than continuing the negotiation on a FTA with South Korea. 
 
ASEAN and China concluded the negotiations on an ACFTA in January 
2004. In November 2001, ASEAN and China agreed on negotiations of ACFTA 
which would enhance economic, trade and investment cooperation among the two 
nations and it would facilitate more effective economic integration. In 2004, 
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ACFTA pressured Japan to conclude a FTA negotiation with ASEAN rather than 
a FTA with Korea, putting an end to the JKFTA. 
 
In January 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi made the first formal visit to 
Southeast Asia and proposed an initiative called the AJCEP. In October 2003, the 
leaders of ASEAN and Japan signed the Framework for the AJCEP during the 
Bali Summit and in April 2005, Japan and ASEAN then began formal 
negotiations on the AJCEP. After the nine rounds of negotiations, in August 2007, 
ASEAN and Japan reached a general agreement on merchandise for trade in 
August 2007. The AJCEP was Japan’s attempt not to lose leadership in the FTA 
formation in East Asia. Japan aimed for the comprehensive EPA with Southeast 
Asian nations, covering investment, trade facilitation, competition policy, and 
cooperation in technology transfer and intellectual property, as well as 
conventional tariff cuts (Yoshimatsu, 2008). AJCEP has emphasized not only 
tariffs and investment regulations but also has aimed to construct environments 
cohesive to both Japan and ASEAN, incorporating cooperative elements and 
undertaking negotiations on each item for trade in goods in pursuit of a high-level 
agreement (MOFA, 2008b, p.16). This in-depth approach was aimed to 
differentiate its approach from the Chinese one, to approach more closely to the 
Southeast Asian countries. 
 
In addition to an FTA with ASEAN as a whole, Japan sought to form an 
FTA with individual ASEAN members. Japan had adopted the dual track 
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approach which forged bilateral partnership with individual ASEAN countries 
along-side negotiating an agreement with ASEAN as a whole. Japan believed the 
swift EPAs with ASEAN or the high economic exchange with ASEAN could 
distance China-ASEAN’s export competitiveness by exchanging the information 
and technology from Japan (MOFA, 2008a). Japan initially completed a bilateral 
FTA commitment with Singapore in January 2002. Tokyo speeded up the FTA 
negotiations with Southeast Asian countries after early 2004. Beginning formal 
negotiations with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and in August 2007, 
Japan had signed EPAs with Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Brunei. In January 2007, Japan started formal negotiations for an 
EPA with Vietnam. Japan had formed bilateral trade relationships with almost all 
Southeast Asian countries, with the aim of formulating substantial EPA networks 
with ASEAN members, and stealing the momentum from China’s EPA (Desker, 
2004, p.13). Here, Japan’s over concern over China who holds a lot of power in 
the East Asian region accelerated negotiations with Southeast Asian countries. 
The growing interests in ASEAN and its members who are targeted as the main 
actors by FTA partners have negatively impacted on the progress of the JKFTA 
which was halted in 2004. Since Japan and China stood in a rivalry position over 
the leadership role in East Asia, this has drawn Japan’s interests away from the 
JKFTA, Japan rivaled with China in the amount FTAs conducted with ASEAN 
and competed over the economic influence over ASEAN. 
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3.3.3  Japan’s Stance on an East Asia-wide FTA 
As already mentioned, Japan proposed the CEPEA as a concept for an 
East Asia-wide FTA. In April 2006, the CEPEA was formally presented in 
METI’s report called the Global Economic Strategy which was intended to create 
an EPA among ASEAN+3+3 including India, Australia and New Zealand (METI, 
2006). In August 2006, during the ASEAN+3 Economic Ministers meeting, the 
Japanese METTI Minister advanced the launch of an unofficial study of the 
CEPEA. In January 2007, during the second EAS meeting, Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe officially declared the deal of pursuing a 16-nation EPA and 
the leaders advocated a pact to form a private-level study group to investigate the 
idea. The final result of the research was disclosed at the EAS Economic 
Ministers’ working lunch meeting where the leaders united in taking measures to 
the phase-II, private-level research. 
 
Japan’s preference on the ASEAN+6 membership including India, 
Australia and New Zealand in the CEPEA, was to have a progressive relation with 
the US (Nezu, 2010). The proposal of an East Asia Economic Community 
(EAEC), recommended by Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahatir, met with a 
heavy violent resistance from the US and the US also terminated the proposal to 
build an Asian version of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Nezu, 2010). 
By remembering the failure of creating EAEC and IMF with the heavy resistance 
from the US, Japan assured that the involvement of New Zealand and Australia 
would decrease the hospitality of the US about Asian nations coming together and 
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excluding the US. Moreover, the plan of ASEAN+6 would enable Japan to 
counter their rival China, with the help of major developed powers like Australia, 
India, New Zealand, and the US. 
 
Japan especially welcomed India’s participation in the CEPEA and the 
start of the cooperative formation of four Working Groups to study Economic 
Cooperation, Rules of Origin, and Customs Procedures and Tariff Nomenclature 
of the region (PIB, 2010). India preferred to host the next workshop on Rules of 
Origin, and while discussing the future steps under the CEPEA process, Indian 
Minister supported Japan's paper which suggested a procedure and timeline. Both 
Japanese and Indian Ministers agreed that the CEPEA negotiations are currently 
at an advanced stage, and the negotiating teams are working hard to give it a final 
push (Sharma, 2010). Furthermore, India and Japan have joined to form a high 
level strategic partnership which allocated full potential to take advantage of the 
region through the bilateral trade relationships.  
 
Japan’s initiation of CEPEA along with Australia, India and New Zealand, 
with the launching of an intimate strategic partnership with India, was to keep an 
eye on China. In terms of membership of East Asia Wide FTA, Japan expected to 
include India, Australia and New Zealand on ASEAN+3 member countries which 
China did not willing to include (Shigematsu, 2006, p.25). 
9
 In October 2003 
                                                          
9
 “At the meeting of the second EAS in Cebu, the Philippines, China has been trying to seize the 
initiative in this regional undertaking by pushing for a 13-nation membership. In an attempt to 
prevent Beijing from calling the shots, Japan has been lobbying hard for adding India, Australia 
and New Zealand to this list.” (Asahi Sinbun, 2007 January, p.17). 
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during the ASEAN+3 Summit, Chinese leader Wen Jiabao presented an idea and 
researched the practicability of establishing a FTA in East Asia. In September 
2004, on the basis of Wen’s proposal, the ASEAN+3 economic ministers agreed 
to set up an expert group to conduct a feasibility study of the East Asia Free Trade 
Area (EAFTA). The group scheduled four rounds of meeting from April 2005 to 
July 2006, and in August 2006, they outlined the conference for the ASEAN+3 
Economic Ministers (ASEAN, 2009, p.12). In January 2007, at the ASEAN+3 
summit, leaders were pleased with the outcome of the group’s study and 
consented to South Korea’s proposal to conduct the phase II study which involved 
the in-depth study and sector-by-sector analysis of the EAFTA. The first meeting 
of the EAFTA phase II study was introduced in Seoul in May 2007 (ASEAN, 
2009, p.53). 
 
This thesis asserts that China’s great power emergence influenced Japan’s 
policies and made several regional integration mechanisms. This assertion is 
supported by a senior METI official, who explained the objective of the CEPEA 
concept, stating that ‘China will take the lead in +3 negotiations. We should 
promote +6 negotiations ahead of the curve’ (Yoshimatsu, 2008, p.154). 
 
After the launch of RCEP, Japan simultaneously participated the trade 
partnership called Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). TPP was initiated by the 
United States, and Japan believed its participation to TPP would enable access to 
bigger and stronger markets such as the markets of the EU and the US, checking 
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China’s extensive power acquisition with the help of the EU and the US (Kwon & 
Shin, 2011, pp.81-82). Japan could not be a relief from China by involving in the 
RCEP. Therefore, Japan negotiated an FTA with the United States and other 
major developed countries. Japan’s pursuit of stronger economic partnerships in 
the East Asian region with the major developed countries provoked serious 
concern among Chinese officials. Accordingly, China became more active in 
operating RCEP
10
 and urged Japan to conclude the trilateral FTA agreement with 
China and South Korea in 2002 (Terada, 2012, p.4). While Japan has maintained 
its target of interstate cooperation in East Asia, it has sought for other regional 
FTAs that are more favorable to Japan over China. 
 
3.4  South Korea and FTA Networks in East Asia 
3.4.1  Korea’s Overall FTA Policies 
Until the 1990s, South Korea’s trade had been developed under the 
multilateral trading system. In 1967, Korea signed GATT and was incorporated 
into the multilateral trading system. South Korea could reduce tariffs and non-
tariff trade barriers and achieve the export-led economic growth by the eight 
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.
11
 
                                                          
10
 China in particular was extremely active in support of RCEP. According to the data from IMF, 
the GDP share of potential RCEP members, China took the highest percentage of 37% (Jin, 2013). 
 
11
The multilateral trade negotiations applied to negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). The eight GATT sessions were 1st Round: Geneva Tariff Conference, 1947; 
2nd Round: Annecy Tariff Conference, 1949; 3rd Round: Torquay Tariff Conference, 1950-51; 
4th Round: Geneva Tariff Conference, 1955-56; 5th Round: Dillon Round, 1960-61; 6th Round: 
Kennedy Round, 1963-67; 7th Round: Tokyo Round, 1973-79; 8th Round: Uruguay Round, 1986-
94. 
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In the second half of the 1990s, major Asian countries began to participate 
actively in regional trade and with this trend the Korean government turned its 
multilateral trading policy to the FTA policy. In 1998, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration spurred the neoliberal political regime, under the pretext of the 
1997 IMF Crisis. Kim’s administration prioritized the countries with the relative 
disadvantage in competitiveness in their national capitals and business structures. 
Chile, New Zealand, Thailand, and Mexico were geographically distant countries 
from Korea but South Korea signed the FTAs with these countries as it could 
capitalize over the superiority on the manufacturing sector and could minimize the 
domestic costs for FTAs as these countries had low competitiveness in their 
industrial structures. Moreover, these countries were the representatives of the 
agricultural product exporting countries that Seoul’s Chaebol could expand their 
“strategic export goods and business” more effectively.12 Moreover, trade with 
these countries was modest in size that the government did not have to worry 
about the big national impact that comes along with a FTA. 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration in 2003 started several FTAs, setting a 
goal of becoming the financial hub of the Northeast Asian region. President Roh 
built the strategic FTA network, expanding the FTAs with major economic and 
resource-rich countries around the world. This systematic and comprehensive 
policy was called “FTA Roadmap” and preceded to “simultaneous FTA 
promotion” (Kang, 2009). The FTA Roadmap set in September 2003 by president 
                                                          
12
 These were Iron, steel, petrochemical, semiconductor, automotive, shipbuilding, electronics, and 
retail business. 
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Roh Mu Hyun led toward the Northeast Asian region’s peace, cooperation and 
expansion of FTAs with other regions. The major direction for President Roh’s 
FTA was to pursue the FTAs with huge advanced economies and emerging 
market countries with rich resources while promoting multi-simultaneous FTAs 
(Park, 2011). South Korea also selected small countries which may cause little to 
no damage on the domestic industries. Chile was one of the small countries where 
Korea liked it as a FTA partner. Chile had a different industrial structure to South 
Korea that their industries were very complementary- Chile was abundant with 
natural resources while Korea’s industrial structure consisted of manufactured 
goods (Cheong, 2002, p.26). Most of South Korea’s FTAs were propelled during 
Roh’s presidential tenure. Besides the FTAs with Chile and Singapore, FTA 
effectuation of sixteen countries and FTA negotiation with twenty nine countries 
were done by the president Roh: EFTA(2005), ASEAN (2005), Canada (2005), 
Mexico(2006), India(2006), the United States (2006), the EU(2007) (Lee, 2011, 
p.225). 
 
 Based on these policies, Korea brought four FTAs into force with fifteen 
countries and particularly concluded FTAs with the US, the EU, and India to 
strengthening South Korean trade. In 2006, the Trade Minister of Korea flew to 
the United States and declared the US-Korea FTA initiation and simultaneously 
promoted FTAs with many other countries. President Roh’s FTA strategy 
managed to recover the delayed FTA and speed up the process of globalization. 
President Roh achieved four of Korea’s FTAs, went into force and concluded 
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three FTAs while waiting for the domestic ratification and six FTA negotiations 
are in process. [Table 3-4] shows the four FTAs that went into force are Chile, 
Singapore, EFTA, and ASEAN and the negotiations on FTAs with the EU, the US, 
India Canada, Mexico, GCC, Australia, New Zealand, and Peru were preceded 
well during his presidential term. 
 [Table 3- 4] South Korea’s FTA Propulsion Status (February 10, 2013 standard) 
Progress Country Negotiation period Entry into Force 
Take effect Chile 1998.11 – 2002.10 2004. 04. 01 
Singapore 2002.11 – 2004.11 2006. 03. 02 
ASEAN 2003.12 – 2009.08 
(2003.10 – 2006.04 
(Product) 
– 2007.11 (Service) 
– 2009.09 (Investment) ) 
2009. 09. 01 
(2007. 06. 01 (P) 
2009. 05. 01 (S) 
2009. 09. 01(I)) 
India 2004.10 – 2009.02 2010. 01. 01 
United States 2004.11 – 2011.11 2012. 03. 15 
EFTA 2005.01 – 2005. 12 2006. 09. 01 
Peru 2005.11 – 2011.06 2011. 08. 01 
EU 2006.05 – 2010.10 2011. 07. 01 
Reach agreement Turkey 2008.06 – 2012.11  
Columbia 2009.03 – 2012.06  
On negotiation Canada 2004.11 –   
China 2004.09 –   
China-Japan-
Korea 
2009.10 –   
Vietnam 2010.06 –   
On preparation Mexico 2000.05 –  
MERCOSUR 2004.11 –   
Australia 2006.12 –   
New Zealand 2006.12 –   
GCC 2008.04 –   
Japan 2008.06 –  
(1998.11 – 2004.11) 
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Israel 2009.05 –   
Middle East 2010.10 –   
Source: Referred to the material of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) (2013) 
Lee Myung-Park administration from 2008 to 2013 presented the goal of 
extending the Roh administration’s FTA aim of becoming the hub country in 
Northeast Asia. President Lee supported Korean companies’ global market 
maintenance and to maximize the effectiveness of FTA. He adopted the US FTA 
model, not only eliminating tariffs of goods, but also service, investment, 
government procurement, intellectual property rights, and technical standards. 
Thus Lee administration promoted the comprehensive FTA orientation. 
 
As shown above, some of the strategies that the Korean presidents used for 
FTAs have been high-level FTAs with major developed economies, particularly 
with the US. This thesis has arranged Korea’s FTA strategies into four big 
categories. First, South Korea FTA strategy has been multi-simultaneous in the 
choices of priority and destination of countries. This was to retrieve the receded 
FTA progress by reducing Korean corporate opportunity costs, offsetting negative 
negotiation effects and maximizing the overall profit. Second, South Korea’s 
ultimate FTA goal is to sign the FTAs with major developed economies. Among 
the major developed economic countries, the US was set as the priority in 
negotiating for a FTA. As Korea’s FTA primary stemmed from securing the 
existing export markets and stabilizing the supply of export markets in the 
advanced economy countries were essential to be its major trading partners. Third, 
the Korean government has aimed to pursue the high leveled comprehensive FTA 
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strategy. South Korea’s another key reason of beginning FTAs was to liberalize 
and to open the markets in order to strengthen the economic fundamentals and 
advance the systems. Eventually, the high leveled FTAs with major economy 
trading partners in multi-simultaneous promotion is Korea’s eventual ambition, 
but in the consideration of priority, the US which takes first priority (Lee, 2011, 
pp.227-228). 
 
3.4.2  Korea’s Preferences for the JKFTA 
South Korea initially had a positive consideration in setting Japan as its 
FTA partner with its geographic proximity, an advanced economic system, and 
being the only two WTO member countries where excluded from concluding FTA 
with each other (Cheong, 2001b, p.93). Consequently, Japan and South Korea 
agreed on beginning the FTA negotiations in 2003, aiming to settle the JKFTA in 
2005. However, South Korea’s positive perspective on the JKFTA gradually 
faded away with Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and South 
Korea was skeptical to losses and gains from the FTA. Japan and South Korea 
conducted a joint research and continued FTA negotiations step by step. During 
this process, the Korean government realized the high possibility of the JKFTA 
deteriorating Korea’s products and benefits when comparing Japanese tariffs to 
South Korean tariffs. Japanese tariffs on goods were significantly lower than 
South Korea’s. Korea’s tariff on manufacturing was around 5 to 7% but Japan did 
not impose any tariff on manufacturing cars, vehicle parts, and electronic products 
and imposed low taffies of 0 to 2% to other manufacturing products such as 
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refined products, chemicals, rubber, plastics, steel, and etc (KIEP et al., 2002, pp. 
3- 4). 
 
Furthermore, until the early the 2000s when the JKFTA negotiation was 
halted, Japanese export commodities were superior over Korean export 
commodities. However, South Korea had very similar export commodities with 
Japan such as computers, semiconductors, wireless telecommunications 
equipment, consumer electronics, automotive, steal, rubber and tires. They were 
inferior in almost all of items (KIEP et al., 2002, p.6). South Korea worried about 
losing its position in the global market by losing the competition with Japan’s 
manufacturing commodities. Korea believed the superior Japanese manufacturing 
goods would outpace its domestic goods and eventually Korea’s manufacturing 
goods could not develop further and be dependent on Japan’s export goods. 
 
Besides Japan’s superior manufacture, the impact of South Korea’s 
industry on the Japanese economy was considerably lower than that of Japan’s 
industry on the Korean economy. The international industry input-output study by 
the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) showed that the maximum effect the 
Korean industry had on the Japanese industry was 0.050 (electric, electronic, and 
mechanic) while the maximum effect of the Japanese industry was 0.103 (electric, 
electronic, and mechanic), implying that South Korea had two times higher 
dependency on Japan than Japan depended on Korea (Choi et al., 2008. pp. 59-60). 
South Korea was highly dependent on Japan’s intermediate goods (materials) and 
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capital goods (manufacturing facilities) which were used to produce Korea’s key 
export commodities (KOTRA, 2009). South Korea had a high dependency on 
trading goods with Japan that South Korea worried about the JKFTA which Japan 
could take advantage over South Korea.  
 
An equally important factor that obstructed the JKFTA conclusion was 
South Korea’s global-oriented FTA strategy. Since 2003 when President Roh 
Moo-Hyun proposed the road map for FTAs, South Korea has planned the multi-
track FTA strategy and comprehensive FTA with major economic powers such as 
the United States and the European Union (MOFAT, 2006). South Korea believed 
the FTAs with the US and the EU would accelerate Korea’s market oriented 
reforms, upgrade its economy, and help to overcome the possible scenario of 
Korea being sandwiched between Japan and China (Koo, 2011, p.10).
 13
 The 
access to the US and the EU markets was believed to be helpful in strengthening 
South Korea to compete with its counterparts, China and Japan (Woo, 2007, 
pp.126-127).
 14
 Besides, South Korea has had a structural trade deficit with Japan 
with the high-value-added components and machines. Accordingly, Seoul struck 
the free trade deals with both the US and the EU in order to drag its feet from the 
                                                          
13
 President Roh asserted in the speech to Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry on March 28
, 
2006, “China is surging. Japan is reviving. Trapped between China and Japan, South Korea 
desperately needs to develop a strategy to cope with current challenges. One of the most effective 
ways to accomplish this goal is to improve our country’s competitive edge against China and 
Japan in the U.S. market by concluding a KORUS FTA” (Koo, 2009, p.190). 
14
 At the ceremony for the conclusion of Korea-EU FTA negotiations on July 13, 2009, President 
Lee expressed his hope and belief that South Korea’s lagging service industry would benefit from 
freer trade with the EU as a powerhouse of the global service industry, accounting for 46.5 percent 
of global trade in services (Chosun Ilbo, 2009). 
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negotiation with Japan for fear of an increase in the deficit. In addition, under the 
global-oriented FTA strategy frame, South Korean companies like Hyundai Motor 
and Samsung Electronics have achieved the great success in the world market and 
have preferred the free trade deals with America or Europe rather than with Japan 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2010).
15
 
 
3.4.3  Korea’s Stance on an East Asia-wide FTA 
South Korea has intensified FTA activities extensively and interactively. 
South Korea concluded eight FTAs with forty-five countries and negotiations are 
under way for eight new FTAs with thirteen additional countries including the 
FTA with China (Chae, 2012). Moreover as shown in the [Table 3- 4], a majority 
of South Korea’s FTA partners are from outside of the region, especially huge 
economies like the EU and the US. Being a country with lack of natural resources 
and with a small domestic market, it has sought for the markets with the cheap 
raw materials and processed them into high value-added products for sale in the 
global market. Thus South Korea has primarily shown interests in the economic 
cooperation and free trade agreements with major economic powers to enhance its 
market competitiveness rather than under developed countries (MOFAT, 2003).  
 
Except for two advanced economies, Japan and South Korea, East Asian 
countries are developing nations. South Korea which has highlighted FTAs with 
                                                          
15
 The Asahi Shimbun. 2010. “EDITORIAL: Free trade talks”, August 20. Available: 
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201008200278.html 
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large economies with the aim of expanding the country’s substantial economic 
growth and preferring FTAs with advanced economics, Japan and the rising China, 
over negotiating an East Asia-wide FTA which is comprised of developing 
countries. Moreover, the trilateral Cooperation Secretariat and various trilateral/ 
tripartite processes were actively engaged by the Korean government. The 
analysis conducted by the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) reported 
that South Korea’s FTA strategy in East Asia has focused on a CKFTA or China-
Japan-Korea FTA (CJKFTA) rather than on an East Asia-wide FTA. The Korean 
government has placed CKFTA as priority number one, CJKFTA, JKFTA, 
ASEAN+3 FTA, ASEAN+6 FTA (RCEP), and TPP as the lowest priority of 
Korea’s FTA strategy in East Asia (Choi & Lee, 2010, p.21).  
 
The second reason for Korea’s lack of coordination in an East Asia-wide 
FTA relates to Korea’s rivalry towards Japan. Korea’s rivalry has deterred its 
keen participation on an East Asia-wide FTA. Currently, the greater economic 
integration in East Asia is led by the US’s initiative called TPP and ASEAN’s 
centered RCEP. As noted earlier, the RCEP was a conversion of China’s initiative 
ASEAN+3 (EAFTA) and Japan’s initiative ASEAN+3 (CEPEA). Regarding 
RCEP, South Koreans have been reluctant to join RCEP with the doubt on its 
initiative. RCEP is an ASEAN-led trade agreement linking the economies of 16 
Asia-Pacific countries but Japan’s overwhelmingly active participation in RCEP 
made Koreans to believe Japan was merged to ASEAN’s East Asia economic 
integration scheme under the name of RCEP to regain its initiative in the East 
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Asia region (Cheong, 2013). Moreover, KERI viewed the Japanese government as 
having a strong support for RCEP from the background thus reflecting Japan’s 
policy direction (Choi & Lee, 2012, p.52). Korea’s suspicion stemmed from 
Japan’s ironical attitude in that Japan has maintained the highest tariff and non-
tariff barriers in various goods to protect its domestic goods while it began and 
lead the discussion of RCEP with ASEAN which requires no tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in goods and services among states (Lee, 2012a; Lee, 2012b). South 
Korea’s check on Japan began since when Japan initiated CEPEA. South Korea 
did not want Japan to take the lead in East Asian regional economy integration 
that it did not show interest in CEPEA. Accordingly, South Korea has preferred to 
support China’s initiative EAFTA rather than supporting Japan’s initiative 
CEPEA due to its concern over Japan holding a bigger power in the East Asia 
region.  
 
Regardless of Korea’s low interest in an East Asia-wide FTA, South Korea 
made a great contribution to the Chinese initiative EAFTA, implying Korea’s 
rivalry toward Japan. On January 14, 2007, President Roh Moo-hyun agreed to 
take a multi-faceted plan for regional cooperation in East Asia with the ten 
members of ASEAN, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe and at the 10
th
 ASEAN+3 summit suggested “ASEAN+3 Science 
Center” establishment to raise the regional scientific cooperation. In this summit, 
President Roh presented the idea of having technical personnel who will be the 
driving force of the EAFTA (Younhap, 2007). Moreover, before the formation of 
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EAFTA, Korean President Kim Dae-jung originally proposed the idea to establish 
East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and East Asia Study Group (EASG) which 
played a significant role in promoting the proposal of EAFTA (MOFA, 2003). In 
addition, in December 2007, South Korean ambassador to China, Lee Kyu-hyung, 
resolutely proposed South Korea’s prioritization of concluding a FTA with China, 
“We would like to accelerate bilateral free trade talks with China” (Kim 2012). 
 
Third, Korea’s important FTA partner has been the US and currently 
South Korea is deeply concentrating on concluding a FTA with China. With 
Korea’s intention to obtain market competitiveness in the East Asian region to 
compete with Japan, Korea regarded the two countries as its key FTA partners. 
The Korea-US FTA has significantly benefited Korea’s economy by increasing 
Korea’s export and foreign investment and creating jobs. Furthermore, by signing 
a FTA with China, the Korean government has anticipated gaining further 
economic advantages with the large Chinese market. As a result, in East Asian 
regional economic integration, where two major economic integration initiatives 
called TPP and RCEP present, Korea has to balance well between the two 
initiatives in order not to offend the either country. The US initiated TPP and the 
US rejected China from joining TPP. On the other hand, China is a member of 
RCEP. With two countries’ counter economic integration directions, Korea could 
not take a clear stance on an East Asia-wide FTA. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
East Asia has benefited by concluding FTAs. FTAs enabled East Asian 
markets to be liberalized, and their economies to be integrated. Along with the 
emergence of regionalism, East Asian countries attempted to establish a region-
wide FTA, but the region-wide FTA has not achieved. This chapter identified a 
main factor that has influenced the slow advancement in East Asia-wide economic 
integration, in terms of Japan and South Korea’s rivalry and differences in the 
target of interstate cooperation. 
 
Japan’s rivalry towards China has aroused Japanese anxiety over China. 
Japan worried over losing its leading position in East Asia. By experiencing 
Japan’s world second largest economy status replacement by China, Japan has 
feared to get left behind by the fast-rising China. Consequently, the Japanese 
bureaucrats initiated a regional oriented FTA once China concluded FTA with 
ASEAN on January 2004. Japan has unceasingly checked China to keep up with 
China. Japanese emphasized to construct a cohesive Japan-ASEAN economic 
relation by adopting a dual track approach which has forged bilateral partnerships 
with individual ASEAN countries alongside with negotiating an agreement with 
ASEAN as a whole. Japan’s rivalry towards China over the leadership role in East 
Asia has drawn Japan’s interests away from the JKFTA which has distanced 
Japan away having a relationship with South Korea, another important power 
nation. 
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South Korea’s rivalry towards Japan stemmed from its overlapping 
industrial structure, very similar export commodities, and the high possibility of 
losing its market position from Japan. From Korea, Japanese commodities were 
superior to Korean exports. Moreover, Korean export products have had relatively 
high tariff rates; less advanced manufacturing goods; and a high dependency on 
Japan’s export goods. Therefore, Korea has concluded FTAs with huge economies 
like the EU and the US from outside of the region to enhance its market 
competitiveness.  
 
Furthermore, Japan and South Korea’s lack of cooperation in an East Asia-
wide economic integration also relates to the two countries’ differences in the 
target of interstate cooperation, which refer to Japan’s interest in an East Asia-
wide interstate interaction while South Korea’s target of Northeast Asia interstate 
coordination and global-oriented cooperation. Japan’s interest in an East Asia-
wide economic cooperation made Japan initiate an East Asia-wide economic 
partnership called Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Trans Pacific 
Partnership (TPP). South Korea, on the other hand, has targeted major powers 
outside of East Asia for its interstate cooperation and Northeast Asian countries. 
South Korea has particularly highlighted FTAs with the EU and the US and in the 
current world economic market which is the focus in China. 
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CHAPTER 4: JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA’S INFLUENCE ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIONALISM 
 
4.1  Introduction 
East Asia has faced various environmental degradations with the 
development of industrialization- green house gas emission, global warming, 
climatic disasters, fresh water contamination, deforestation, transboundary air 
pollution, and other environmental problems. The atmospheric deposition of 
acidity became one of the region’s major environmental problems, causing 
various adverse effects on the environment such as damaging forests and 
agricultural crops as well as causing human health problems. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
and nitrogen oxides (NOx) were the two most significant atmospheric pollutant 
causing industrial pollutants, produced by coal for electric powers, industrial 
activities, and vehicles. Moreover, this atmospheric deposition of acidity, which 
has the nature of spreading transboundary, spreading from one country to its 
neighboring countries, has made the resolution of the pollution complicated. Not 
only are scientific approaches in monitoring pollutants needed but political 
negotiations among governments are also extremely complicated. 
 
The atmospheric pollution in East Asia has been gradually rising. The 
level of emissions of air pollutants within the region has predicted adverse effects 
and its transboundary nature have made countries to urgently seek for solutions to 
the problem. Consequently, countries initiated multilateral talks on the 
transboundary pollution and confirmed their willingness to reinforce international 
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cooperation activities to combat the air pollution. For instance, Southeast Asian 
countries adopted the Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution in 1995, the 
Regional Haze Action Plan in 1997, and are currently negotiating on an ASEAN 
transboudnary haze (Takahashi, 2002, p.222). Moreover, there are particularly 
two important environmental institutions to tackle transboundary air pollution 
problems. First is the Japanese Ministry of Environment initiative Acid Deposition 
Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) and second is the South Korean 
National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) initiative Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollutants in North East Asia (LTP).
16
 
 
Among the regional initiatives to promote environmental sustainability 
and to protect human health in the East Asia region, Japan’s initiative in EANET 
has provided most useful inputs in preventing or reducing adverse impacts on the 
environment by covering the wide range of East Asian participants. It contributed 
to the transboundary air pollution management by adopting pollutant reduction 
strategies and utilizing monitoring station networks, computer-based models of 
atmospheric dispersal, and chemical processes (DiGiovanni & Fellin, 2002). 
However, regardless of EANET’s substantial involvement in regional 
environment improvement, it has failed to progress further as a cooperative 
regional institution. 
 
                                                          
16
 * The Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) is an intergovernmental 
initiative to create a common understanding on the state of acid deposition problems in East Asia 
(sited: http://www.eanet.asia/). 
* Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in North East Asia (LTP) 
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This chapter aims to examine EANET and analyze how Japan and South 
Korea’s interactions and interests have influenced EANET development. EANET 
as an entity of 13 member states has been involved in many issues regarding the 
acid deposition monitoring and dissonance among member states. However, like 
the previous chapter, Japan and South Korea’s relations significantly have 
disrupted the advancement of EANET, a regional cooperative mechanism. 
 
4.2        Transboudanry Air Pollution in East Asia 
Transboundary air pollution refers to the pollution that is created in a 
country and crosses into other countries’ borders, damaging their environments. 
This mobile air pollution has caused serious environmental problems in East Asia 
such as Asian dust and acid deposition which are two major transboundary air 
pollutions of the region.  
 
First, Asian dust is a high speed dust storm from Mongolia, Northern 
China, and Kazakhstan which passes over to Northeast periodically during spring 
(Zhang et al., 2003). Asian dust became a serious regional problem during 
China’s rapid industrialization. The industrialized China has produced enormous 
amount of industrial pollutants and these pollutants mixed with seasonally 
blowing dusts have travelled to the east side of China. In case of South Korea, 
high level of pollutants was observed in dusts when Asian dust arrived from 
China. The level of pollution during the Asian dust period was sometimes higher 
than that of local pollution period (Choi et al., 2001; Park et al., 2007). 
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Every spring, Asian dust has made the East Asian sky hazy with dust and 
caused various health problems, including sore throat, asthma, and death (Chen et 
al., 2004). Beyond the negative effects on human health, dust storm also has been 
associated with desertification of the East Asia region, particularly China, Japan, 
Korea, Mongolia, and Russia (Brown, 2003). Countries geographical proximity 
and harsh influence of transboundary air pollution required a region wide 
treatment for common environmental issues. As a result, China, Japan and South 
Korea initiated a multilateral environmental cooperation in the region called the 
Tripartite Environment Ministers’ Meeting (TEMM) in 1999 (MOE, 2013). 
TEMM was held annually and discussed regional environmental issues of dust 
and sandstorms, transboundary air pollutions, climate change, marine debris and 
in the 2007, TEMM members agreed to carry out the joint research on dust and 
sand storm (Asian dust)(OECD, 2009, p.127). 
 
Second major transboundary air pollution issue in East Asia is regional 
acid deposition. The massive amounts of acidification by coal power plants, 
industries, automobiles, and coal stoves for domestic use were absorbed into rain, 
snow, fog, and gases which have caused negative impacts on the ecosystems, 
environment, and human health in East Asia as the acid has moved to the 
surrounding areas across the border (Chueinta, 2005). For instance, Japan 
estimated that China’s massive energy consumption with its rapid 
industrialization contributed to 50% of the Japanese total sulfate deposition during 
1990s (Ichikawa& Fujita, 1995, p.192). 
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In 1989, a Japanese national survey reported that more sulfur dioxide was 
found all around Japan than originally emitted and scientists hypothesized this 
sulfur emission was transported from China and Korea to Japan (FBIS, 1992; 
Fujita, 1997, p.6). Accordingly, Japan took the initiative on transboundary acid 
deposition problem to which Japan motivated East Asian countries to collaborate 
regionally to effectively address this problem. In 2001, Japan-initiated EANET 
was established by fallowing the model in Europe (EANET, 2010a). 
 
4.3        EANET Outline 
EANET was established under the leadership of Japan to improve East 
Asian countries’ severe acid deposition condition. Japan’s environmental Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) which has played a major role in East Asia 
environmental cooperation since the 1980s launched EANET project. EANET has 
become one of major regional environmental institutions in the East Asian region 
as a typical Asian Regional Environmental Institution (REI), which is not long, 
not legally bounded, and has voluntary commitment. Regardless of its 
significance, EANET had to face challenges in overcoming constraints over 
finance, different national interests, and no stable institution. Therefore, EANET 
has not had full cooperation among East Asian countries but its significant 
environmental damage monitoring enabled thirteen East Asian countries- 
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, 
Republic of Korea, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam- to join. A slow and steady 
progress in East Asian integration has been made over past twenty years via 
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understanding and monitoring transboundary air pollution (ACAP, 2010a). 
Although it has been a subtle cooperation among the East Asian nations, if East 
Asian countries can overcome interest-based barriers through this cooperation, in 
the future, EANET will become the first formal regional institution to deal with a 
shared environmental problem in the region. 
 
4.3.1  EANET Development 
 In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
enhanced regional-level environmental cooperation and the United Nations 
Economic Committee for Europe (UNECE) achieved one of the most successful 
regional initiatives through the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (LRTAP). This convention helped member states to regulate the specific 
pollutant emissions and its success also gave an impetus to the collaboration of 
other regions. The East Asian region was not an exception, as East Asian 
countries adopted the European model of regional environmental cooperation. 
 
The development of EANET has three parts: early stage, preparatory 
activity stage, and regular activity stage. The early stage began in 1993 when East 
Asian countries became aware of the risks and problems of excessive atmospheric 
acid deposition via the report from World Bank which estimated that the regional 
sulfur dioxide emission would be tripled and cause more critical risks if 
conditions remained the same. Japan organized four expert meetings to discuss the 
condition of East Asia acid deposition from 1993 to 1997. The experts who 
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participated in these meetings agreed on the necessity of a regional monitoring 
network with standardized monitoring methods and analytical techniques. 
 
The second stage of preparatory activity began in 1998 based on the 
shared recognition at the early stage. In this stage, the main objectives, activities, 
institutional and financial matters were mainly discussed. The three objectives of 
EANET approved at this stage were 1) examining the feasibility of designed 
network activities, relevant guidelines, and technical manuals; 2) providing time 
for participating countries to develop their national monitoring systems; 3) 
providing recommendations for the improvement of the network (Matsuoka, 2010, 
p.18).  
 
The first session of Intergovernmental Meeting (IG Meeting) began in 
1998, initiated by the Japanese government with nine member states and included 
China as an observer (Lee, 2011, p.62). Throughout the meetings, participants 
agreed on strengthening acid deposition to cover chemical components and 
establishing a regional monitoring network. Namely, EANET raised the 
awareness of keeping the common understanding of the problem in East Asia by 
cooperating on the issues related to acid deposition; and providing information 
and education on a local, national, and regional levels in regards to the severe 
impact of acid deposition and the way to prevent or reduce the impact of acid 
deposition on the environment (ACAP, 2010b).  
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From the third session of IG meeting in 2001, the regulatory-phase 
activities have taken a place along with annual meetings of inter-government and 
scientific advisory committees. In this stage, EANET adopted the objectives of 
sharing common understanding in East Asia with the acid deposition problems, 
providing useful inputs to prevent and reduce adverse effects from acid deposition 
on a local, national, and regional level, and contributing to the cooperation of 
participating countries on the issues related to acid deposition (Matsuoka, 2010, 
p.19). They agreed to fix the regulatory intergovernmental meetings, the Scientific 
Advisory Committee, the Secretariat, and the Network Center to promote network 
activities through the communication, coordination, and collaboration of the 
participating countries (Lee, 2011, p.64) and to agree on the amount of sulfur 
dioxide emission and reductions (Hyun et al., 2005, p.103).  
 
On the fourth session of IG meeting in 2002, EANET examined and 
formulated its institutional framework and at the fifth IG meeting in 2003, 
EANET began to look beyond its primary role of monitoring acid deposition, but 
sought for the institution’s further development and effective operation by 
establishing the Working Group on Future Development of EANET (WGFD). 
The main purpose of WGFD was to check on the Secretariat and the Network 
Center in their administrative and financial management performances. The fifth 
session of IG meeting pointed out the heavy burdening of financial support on 
Japan and agreed that other member countries should make an effort to provide 
financial support for the Secretariat (EANET, 2003).  
79 
 
The number of countries participating in EANET increased to thirteen in 
2005 and the countries firmly discussed about providing the sound basis for 
administrative expenditure contribution to EANET and to report the result on the 
tenth session of the Intergovernmental Meeting (EANET, 2005). In the eighth IG 
meeting, five-year medium term plan for EANET’s development was adopted 
with EANET Scientific Advisory Committee’s periodical reports; on the ninth 
session of Intergovernmental Meeting, the Scientific Advisory Committee of 
EANET created a new subsidiary body; and on the tenth Intergovernmental 
meeting, an agenda modification took a place to strengthen EANET. The first 
change was the “Consideration on Work Program and Budget of EANET” to 
“Review on Work Program and Budget of EANET”. By reviewing the progress 
and function of EANET, member states agreed on improving the transparency of 
EANET and expanding the scope of EANET operations in order to strengthen it 
(EANET, 2011). As of 2013, far fourteen intergovernmental meetings were 
carried out cooperatively monitored the regional acid deposition.  
 
4.3.2   EANET Framework 
EANET being a regional cooperation program has five main bodies. First 
is the main decision-making body called the intergovernmental meeting; second is 
the Scientific Advisory Committee where provides scientific advice and creates 
scientific reports under the intergovernmental meetings; third is the Secretariat 
where is authorized to support network activities and collaborate with 
participating countries’ national centers, national focal points, and national quality 
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assurance/ quality control (QA/QC) manager; fourth is the Network Center where 
Japan’s Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research Center (ADORC) is in charge; 
and fifth are National Focal Points, National QA/QC, and National Center 
(MERK, 2006; EANET, 2010b). 
 
[Figure 4.1] Institutional Framework for EANET 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Institutional Framework for EANET in http://www.eanet.asia/eanet/org.html 
 
4.3.3   EANET Major Activities  
International environment cooperation in East Asia is still in its early 
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over the development of their countries. However, the establishment of EANET 
contributed to cleanse and eliminate East Asian countries’ fundamental 
environmental problems. East Asian countries used to have a difficulty in 
measuring the amounts of pollutant and recognizing and understanding causes and 
effects of acid deposition. Moreover, due to the lack of resources in monitoring air 
pollution in developing countries and lack of common air pollution monitoring 
methods between countries, countries were not able to handle problems regarding 
environmental pollution. However, six major activities carried out by EANET 
enabled East Asian countries to prevent and reduce the harmfulness of acid 
deposition. The six major activities conducted by EANET were first, the 
deposition monitoring which reviews monitoring plans of member states and 
implements common monitoring method; second, the evaluation or review of 
national monitoring data as well as the issue of annual and periodic reports; third, 
the promotion of quality control or EANET program; fourth, the assistance in 
technology and capability building; fifth, the promotion of research and studies 
regarding acid deposition problems; and sixth, notifying the public to participate 
in the activities of EANET. Concisely, EANET has adopted three processes of 
regional networking, promotion of good governance and implementing concrete 
measures (Miyazaki, 2011, p.2), which have been the driving force of this 
institution. 
 
These major endeavors of EANET enhanced the public’s awareness on 
acid deposition issues through the annual EANET Workshop on Public 
82 
 
Awareness on acid deposition problems and the importance of community. 
EANET improved the environment of the region by raising capacities in 
monitoring and assessing acid deposition through the Japanese assistance in 
monitoring, laboratory operation, data management, and personnel training. A 
number of scientific research projects were conducted in collaboration with 
member countries by using the standardized monitoring methodologies and 
central data collection system (Miyazaki, 2010, p.13). 
 
4.3.4  EANET Challenges 
Despite EANET’s great performance in monitoring and various activities, 
EANET has faced two major challenges. The first challenge has been the 
institutional operation and the second challenge has been that other member 
countries’ prevention on Japan from taking a leading position in EANET. The 
first challenges in the institutional operation stemmed from the different levels of 
financial and technical knowledge of the member states, different understandings 
of the environmental problems (Brettell & Kawashima, 1998). Shortage of human 
resources and limited funding in institution are two major difficulties in 
institutional operation. The shortage of human resources refers to the short supply 
of people who are able to collect national monitoring data and to coordinate with 
the Secretariat and Network Center. For instance, Japan and South Korea maintain 
high levels of human resources at their national network centers and monitoring 
centers but other participating countries are short of hands. Highly educated 
personnel are needed at EANET to carry out the institutional circulation. Without 
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people who can monitor and measure the acid deposition in each participating 
country, EANET can hardly operate fully as an intergovernmental institute. 
 
EANET funds have been paid voluntarily by participant countries which 
amount to around US $1 Million, annually (Roman, 2009). This voluntary 
financial contribution has not been sufficient to maintain this intergovernmental 
network as most East Asian countries shifted their financial responsibilities to 
Japan by having a lower national budget thus justifying Japan’s financial 
sponsorship. Most East Asian countries are developing countries and a number of 
East Asian countries have believed Japan’s coverage of EANET funding is 
inevitable duty with its past historical offenses. Especially those who were 
occupied by Japan considered it as Japan’s responsibility on funding as the 
compensation for its inhumanity over the history. Despite being a founder of 
EANET and a victim of transboundary air pollution from China, Japan has to 
cover most of EANET’s operational fees. Since the fourth session of IG meeting 
in 2002, China has provided funding to EANET and other member countries also 
became more cooperative in discussing over the issues of financial management 
but still more active contribution to EANET funding is necessary for its continuity. 
 
 The second challenge is the other member countries’ prevention of Japan 
taking a leading position in EANET. Japan’s performance in EANET has been 
watched by other East Asian countries, sometimes being criticized. Korean 
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Ministry of Environment raised three major issues on Japan’s involvement in 
EANET operation (MERK, 2006, p.43): 
1) EANET organization and system are similar to the European Monitoring 
and Evaluation Programme (EMEP)
17
 but it has been operated differently, 
a sided by a particular country. The Secretariat of EANET is installed in 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Regional Resource 
Centre for Asia and the Pacific (RRC. AP), but Japan is in charge of 
framing agenda and meeting materials. In other words, the agenda related 
to financial division and regional agreements are not proposed by the 
formal meeting but by Japan’s random inclusion on the agenda. 
 
2) EANET’s Science Advisory Committee is a yearly conference and it has 
limitations in supporting technology to the network center. Therefore, the 
task forces, experts from member countries gathering and performing tasks, 
and expert network have played a very important role in the Science 
Advisory Council operation. However, the network center substantially 
writes the report while the only role for the task force and expert network is 
to approve it. In order to ensure the fairness of the network, task force and 
network center has to share the responsibility and authority in performing a 
given task. 
 
3) Besides one Network Center deputy director, all other personnel are 
from the Japanese Ministry of Environment, Niigata Prefecture 
Environmental Research Institute, and Acid Deposition and Oxidant 
Research Center (ADORC) personnel. The replacement in experts is very 
rare in that it is difficult to find more professionals in EANET. 
                                                          
17
 EMEP is a scientifically based and policy driven programme under the Convention on Long-
range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) for international co-operation to solve 
transboundary air pollution problems. <http://www.emep.int/> 
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The failure in the binding of institutionalization in the East Asian 
environmental cooperation has been common with unequal distribution of power 
between different countries (Jho & Lee, 2009, p.42). Countries who felt like it 
was unfair that a particular country gain more power did not cooperate. EANET is 
a typical case that shows transnational efforts do not always lead to cooperation 
due to unequal power distribution. Conflicts that occur during cooperation are 
hard to mediate and in the process of EANET development, mainly two countries, 
Japan and South Korea, have had nonstop disagreements over the functions of 
EANET. As shown in the Korean Ministry of Environment proposal, South Korea 
has criticized Japan’s monopoly of power in EANET. South Korea has shown the 
less amount of motivation in participating EANET’s activities and has established 
another transnational environmental mechanism to face off against Japan’s lead of 
regional environmental cooperation. Along with South Korea, China also has 
shown an uncomfortable feeling toward Japan’s initiative of regional level 
environment protection, assuming that Japan has a concealed purpose of holding 
regional environment governance initiatives. 
 
4.4    Japan and EANET 
4.4.1    Japan’s Policies for Transboundary Air Pollution 
Industrialization caused the environmental pollution in Japan. In 1960, an 
industrial city in Mie Prefecture named “Yokkaichi City” was damaged by serious 
air pollution and local residents suffered from asthma and respiratory diseases 
(Fukushima, 2005, p.58). Contagious air pollution diseases spread throughout 
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Japan and because of this the air pollution monitoring was launched in large cities 
in 1962 and the Air Pollution Control Law was enacted in 1968 (Fukushima, 2005, 
p.58). Several environment protection actions had helped Japan to solve its severe 
air pollution but the Japanese air pollution problem was not limited to Japan. 
 
Japan used to believe its air pollution was caused by its own domestic 
contamination rather than from the outside emissions. Japan understood its acid 
rain was largely due to its active volcanic activities, finding that Japan’s volcanic 
activities accounted for over 60% of total deposition and composing 20% of 
Japan’s sulfur deposition (Carmichael & Arndt, 1997, p.5). Furthermore, Japan 
used to think the harm from acid rain could be resolved naturally with its land’s 
high neutralization capacity, composed with high level of calcium (OECD, 2002, 
p. 252). Therefore, Japan partially monitored its domestic air pollutants, judging 
that damages from air pollutants could be solved by itself (Kim, 2007, p.448). 
 
Accordingly, the Japanese environmental policy towards transboundary 
air pollution was relatively a low priority. However, after being aware of the 
deterioration of the air quality accompanied with East Asian countries’ rapid 
economic and technological development, Japan began to become more 
concerned about transboundary air pollution and took appropriate cooperation 
with other countries in order to solve transboundary air pollution problem. The 
measures of East Asian countries against transboundary air pollution began in the 
early 1990s.  
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Despite Japan’s belated awareness of transboundary air pollution, Japan 
initiated several acid rain preventive programs. Japan’s high management capacity 
and leadership significantly alerted the harm from acid rain to the East Asian 
region and mentored East Asian countries by providing expert advice. First in 
1997, experts decided to establish a regional monitoring network where countries 
could standardize acid rain monitoring methodology. In April 1998, EANET was 
launched. EANET provided useful information for member countries to prevent 
negative impacts of transboundary air pollution. With EANET as Japan’s leading 
transboundary policy, Japan has shown the cooperative and leading behaviors in 
the pollution issue. 
 
Second, Japan’s preference in solving transboundary air pollution 
through a region-wide environmental cooperation was also reflected through the 
ECO-ASIA (Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific), a regime 
which the Japanese Ministry of Environment launched in 1991. This forum 
was to exchange views of environmental ministers in the Asia Pacific 
region and the meetings of environment ministers or senior officials have 
held annually (MOE, 2008). Similar to the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the regional development 
arm of the United Nations for the Asia-Pacific region, ECO-ASIA also engaged 
in basic information gathering and forecasting. ECO-ASIA supported 
EANET through information exchange and these two Japan-led broader 
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frameworks reflected Japan’s approach to regional environmental 
cooperation. 
 
Third, Chapter 9 of the National Action Plan for Agenda 21 addressed 
Japan’s assistance towards developing East Asian countries to prevent 
transboundary air pollution (MOE, 1994). This governmental measure is to 
protect air quality while focusing on promoting research and technology to 
establish the acid precipitation monitoring network in East Asia to effectively 
manage the East Asian region’s acid deposition; implementing effective measures 
and comprehensive actions towards polluting nations; developing technologies to 
reduce the air pollutant emission suitable for developing countries and in 
transferring such technologies through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms 
(MOE, 1993). 
 
Fourth, the ERTDF (The Environment Research and Technology 
Development Fund) of the Ministry of the Environment is a research activity to 
solve the transboundary air pollution. This project began with the awareness of 
serious environmental problems toward humans and the aim of constructing a 
sustainable society through the promotion of survey- style research and advanced 
techniques. Under this strategic research oriented government scheme, Director- 
General of Asia Center for Air Pollution Research, Akimoto Hajime, carried out a 
number of experiments to solve transboundary air pollution problems in East Asia 
(ACAP, 2010a). He claimed that collaborative atmospheric management was 
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needed in order to improve the air pollution problems of the East Asia region. 
These managements first quantified air pollution in East Asia; second improved 
inventories and scanning capacities for air pollution in East Asia; and lastly 
researched on a mutually beneficial way of controlling air pollution in East Asia 
(ACAP, 2010c). 
 
Along with Japan’s efforts in initiating environment related 
multilateral meetings, and with the motivation of protecting East Asia 
environment, Japan has had the ambition to hold the regional environmental 
leadership. Japan where has a rivalry with China has targeted the environmental 
leadership with which China was lagged behind in addressing and supporting 
environmental problems in East Asia. Based on Japan’s strong economy and 
advanced technical dynamics, the Japanese government has carried on the 
embrace of global environmental protection strategy which assists and cooperates 
in transboundary air pollution solution with developing countries in East Asia 
(Finer, 2001, p.42; Potter, 2002, p.152).  
 
Japan has promoted a transboundary air pollution policy that focuses on 
the improvement of developing countries’ environmental management by 
conducting joint technical projects, dispatching experts, providing the necessary 
equipment, and training personnel, as instructed by Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) (CEC, 2005, p.32). Japan has maintained good 
relations with the Regional Economic Commission of the United Nations to 
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efficiently solve the tansboundary air pollution. Moreover, Japan being an 
experienced country which has suffered and overcame severe environmental 
pollution and widespread health injuries has served as a model to reduce or to 
prevent the predictable environment damages of East Asian countries.  
 
The severe environmental damage that Japan faced during its excessive 
industrial development in the 1950s and 1960s strengthened the Japanese 
environmental policy and influenced the way Japan could help developing 
countries which may go down the same path as Japan, encouraging them to take 
the earlier action in environmental protection to avoid paying the high costs by 
not taking action. Furthermore, in the 1980s, Japan began to seek out 
environmental cooperation and adopted the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) 
Environment Committee’s Recommendations of the Directorate on Development 
Assistance Projects and Environmental Assessment of Project in 1985 and made 
the first public pledges to increase its environmental assistance to 300 billion yen 
(JICA, 2001; Armitage, 2009, pp.12-13). Since the 1990s, Japan’s new 
environmental ODA Policy has increased its grant aid and technical assistance. 
Regardless of the possibility of a dilemma in providing massive aid to countries, 
Japan has continuously provided environmental aid to developing countries 
(Potter, 1994, p.200). In 1992, Japan attended the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) to share the experience and programs 
of Europe and North America in dealing with transboundary air pollution in order 
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to solve the problems of acid deposition or acid rain in East Asian countries 
(EANET, 2010a, p.11). Under Japan’s effort to get East Asian countries’ 
profound awareness and cooperation in solving their common environmental 
problem, EANET was drawn up in 1993 and was officially established in 1998. 
As a regional cooperative initiative to promote the East Asian region’s 
environmental sustainability and human health protection, EANET has carried out 
various activities to create common understanding to solve, prevent, and to reduce 
the acid deposition problems in East Asia. 
 
Japan has also carried out a friendly transboundary air pollution policy 
toward its competitor, China. China has been the source of acid deposition in East 
Asia but the Japanese government has never made a formal accusation toward 
China nor asked China to take the responsibility towards the pollution. On the 
contrary, Japan’s government has made a large contribution in creating a regional 
monitoring system through China’s cooperation. Japan’s Environment Agency 
proposed the establishment of a regional acid rain monitoring network in China 
and designated part of its ODA budget to China to carry out acid rain cooperative 
joint projects, scientific research, training programs, monitoring, and to pass on 
their knowledge of environmental protection (Brettell, 2007, p.94). Japan also 
established bilateral cooperation with China, carrying out the ‘Green Aid Plan’ for 
China by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
(Wilkening, 2004, p.211). Japan’s tolerant position towards China was explained 
in the sharing the economic burdens of transboundary air pollution. Moreover, 
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Japan changed the scope of EANET with regards to China. Before launching 
EANET, the Japanese government sought to approach EANET under the scope of 
Northeast Asia. However Japan had concerns of irritating China because China 
felt suspicious with the idea of EANET concentrating in Northeast Asia as China 
know that it had caused a majority of acid deposition in the region. As a result, 
Japan had included Southeast Asian countries in EANET to reduce the possibility 
of irritating China over the environmental contamination.  
 
Japan has been the provider of environmental protection for East Asian 
countries through various environment-related multilateral cooperative initiatives 
and bilateral cooperation with East Asian countries. The Japanese government’s 
environmental protection has included the wish of confirming its leadership role 
in the field of environmental protection among East Asian countries. Through the 
case of China, by assisting China with its environmental protection and 
withstanding China’s interruptions in its multilateral environmental protection 
initiative, Japan wanted to consolidate its leadership in East Asia. 
 
4.4.2    Japan’s Initiation and Support for EANET 
Facing the prospects of increased air pollutants and their possible adverse 
effects to East Asia, East Asia was in an urgency of building a functional 
environmental management system capable of monitoring and fighting against 
local and regional air pollution. Under these circumstances, EANET became one 
of the most important platforms for the East Asian community to address the 
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issues of regional air pollution (MERK, 2002a). Japan’s contribution to EANET 
can be summarized in three aspects. First, Japan initiated EANET which is one of 
the main regional environmental institutions that advanced from Japan’s 
environmental ODA (Matsuoka & Kuchiki, 2003). Japan’s ODA started with 
granting funds and aid to the Thai Environmental Research and Training Center 
(ERTC), the Indonesian Environmental Management Center (EMC), the Sino-
Japan Friendship Center for Environmental Protection, the Mexican 
Environmental Research and Training Center (CENICA), and the Chile 
Environmental Center (CENMA), some of which have become a part of EANET 
(Matsuoka, 2010, pp.34-37). Japan’s ODA has helped developing East Asian 
nations to be able to carry out their own environmental centers, which these 
centers have become a part of the Japanese initiative EANET, and Japan has 
advanced EANET with getting more members involved. 
 
Second, Japan has served as the Network Center of EANET which is a 
major body of EANET. Some of the duties of the Network Center for EANET is 
to compile, evaluate, store data and prepare data reports on the acid deposition in 
the East Asian region. The other duties of the Network Center is collecting data 
and relevant information; implementing and coordinating QA/QC activities; 
providing technical support to the participating countries including the dispatch of 
technicians; implementing training activities; supporting the task forces as their 
secretariats; carrying on research activities such as research for improving 
monitoring methodologies; and promoting public awareness (ACAP, 2010b). 
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Japan has been the hub for the networking for the member states as it has played a 
central role in EANET network, comprehending acid rain and passing that to 
participating countries, providing assistance or solving national problems through 
the dialogue, and coordinating participants. 
 
Third, Japan has contributed most of EANET budget which in general, the 
financial setup of EANET was on a voluntary basis (EANET, 2010c). In the first 
IG meeting in 1998, the Implementation of Preparatory Phase Activities Report 
(EANET/IG 1/6 rev.) accepted the Government of Japan to provide the 
operational costs voluntarily. Several discussions were made in figuring out how 
to share the cost of financial obligation in EANET during the intergovernmental 
meetings but Japan has taken the financial responsibilities over other member 
states. There has been some progress in the budget sharing, for instance at the 
fourth session of IG meeting in 2002, the Chinese government informed its 
voluntary contribution to the budget of EANET starting in 2002 in the amount of 
15,000 USD annually (EANET, 2002). Providing financial assistance for EANET 
operation costs a lot but Japan has contributed a lot for EANET.  
 
Japan has made great contributions to EANET through its high 
technology, abundant finance, and management expertizes. Japan has wanted to 
let the East Asian countries to know that Japan is the only country who can 
provide effective and efficient support for the regional environmental protection. 
Japan has been the most appropriate country to assert the leadership in East Asia 
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environmental management in terms of contribution level. Japan has enjoyed 
keeping the environmental management initiative and firmly kept its leadership in 
the environmental management imitative. However Japan’s strict attitude in 
keeping its leadership position in the East Asia environmental protection and 
cooperation has not only made a great contribution to EANET but also indirectly 
disrupted EANET’s further development. 
 
4.5    South Korea and EANET 
4.5.1    Korea’s Policies for Transboundary Air Pollution 
South Korea’s economic development started in 1960s with the 
promotion of heavy and chemical industries which had severely damaged South 
Korea’s air quality. South Korea’s air quality problem was very serious according 
to OECD statistics in 2004, Seoul’s metropolitan area had ranked as the worst in 
air quality (MERK, 2004). According to the OECD fact book in 2011 to 2012, 
regardless of significant air quality improvement, South Korea still had a high 
CO2 ratio and was exposed to air pollution (OECD, 2011). As a result, air 
pollution has become South Korea’s ongoing concern. 
 
South Korea’s substandard air quality has not only been influenced by its 
domestic industrial activities but also by the trans-boundary air pollutants that 
primarily came from China. Like Japan, Asian dust that moved in from China due 
to climate change and the acid rain formed by China’s massive sulfur dioxide 
emission which accounted for 10 times of South Korea’s emission and marked 
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80% of sulfur dioxide emissions in Northeast Asia have severely damaged 
Korea’s air quality. 
 
In order to counter these transboundary air pollutants, the South Korean 
Ministry of Environment has carried out policies to reduce the transboundary air 
pollution through regional level environmental cooperation. South Korea in 
particular has sought for Northeast Asian countries’ cooperation, stressing the 
necessity of building transboundary air pollution monitoring networks to reduce 
transboundary air pollution. In achieving this objective, South Korea suggested 
particular ways to achieve cooperation in solving transboundary air pollutions. 
First, the improvement of a country’s environmental policy and system is 
necessary; second, the implementation of a pollution responding system to 
effectively deal with the transboundary air pollution such as acid rain and yellow 
sand; and last, the institutionalization of East Asian environmental cooperation 
system (Chu et al., 2005, p.8). As a result, South Korea has initiated three major 
regional mechanisms to deal with transboundary air pollution: NEASPEC; 
TEMM; and LTP.  
 
The first movement toward regional environment cooperation 
advancement was the North-East Asian Subregional Programme for 
Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) which was launched collaboratively in 
1993 by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the United 
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Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP)
18
. 
NEASPEC is an intergovernmental forum which senior officials from foreign 
ministries of member countries come together to solve the transboundary air 
pollution problem which is recognized as one of the most serious regional 
environmental challenges in Northeast Asia. NEASPEC was assisted by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
19
, the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP)
20
, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
(Yoon, 2006, p.82), which had six Northeast Asian countries as its members- 
China, Japan, North Korea, Mongolia, Russia, and South Korea (NEASPEC, 
2009). NEASPEC broadly focused on the areas of energy, air pollution, 
ecosystem management, and capacity building and it particularly emphasized on 
the problem of SO2 air pollutant (Yasumasa, 2010, p.6). NEASPEC established 
two technical centers in South Korea to alleviate transboundary air pollution via 
the collaboration of member states, investigation on Sulfur dioxide and other air 
pollutants, and technical assistance. 
 
                                                          
18
 UNESCAP is the regional development arm of the United Nations for the Asia-Pacific region. 
Established in 1947 with its headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, ESCAP works to overcome some 
of the region’s greatest challenges by providing results oriented projects, technical assistance and 
capacity building to member States in the following areas: Macroeconomic Policy and 
Development/Trade and Investment/ Transport/ Social Development/ Environment and 
Sustainable Development/ Information and Communications Technology and Disaster Risk 
Reduction/ Statistics/ Sub-regional activities for development. <http://www.unescap.org/> 
 
19
 The United Nations' global development network embraces 177 countries cooperating to find 
solutions to global and national development challenges. UNDP has primarily focused on building 
democratic governance, reducing poverty, preventing and recovering crisis, and reserving 
environment and energy. 
 
20
 UNEP is an international institution that coordinates United Nations environmental activities, 
assisting developing countries in implementing environmentally sound policies and practices. It 
was founded as a result of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in June 
1972 and has its headquarters in the Gigiri neighborhood of Nairobi, Kenya. < http://unep.org/> 
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The second important South Korean environmental policy towards the 
transboundary air pollution was the TEMM. TEMM is the Tripartite Environment 
Ministers Meeting which is a ministerial level cooperation which started in 1999 
as the proposal of South Korea’s ministry of environment. Three ministers from 
China, Japan, and Korea shared views on the advancement of their domestic 
environmental conditions by resolving the transboundary air pollution mainly 
Asian dust and sand storms. In the framework of TEMM, three countries 
cooperated for their environmental management and contributed to the regional 
environmental improvement. It was based on the collaboration of the environment 
ministries, going beyond just being an intergovernmental mechanism in which 
one country can take a leadership role in acting as the central hub for the networks 
(Kim, 2009, p.27). This reflects how South Korea handled its transboundary 
environmental problems. 
 
The third policy is the policy called LTP, which also corresponds to the 
way South Korea solve its regional transboundary air pollution. LTP was initiated 
by South Korea which was very similar in functions with EANET, expecting to 
solve its transboundary air pollution collectively through the collaboration among 
numerous regional countries, experts, and other actors rather than by a traditional 
state-centric problem solving method (Garner, 1996, pp.121-127). LTP was very 
similar to TEMM as their interests laid in Northeast Asia in discussing effective 
solutions for transboundary air pollution rather than focusing on East Asia. Started 
in 1995, it has conducted research, discussed the proposed reports by participant 
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countries, contributed in organizing research foundation for transboundary air 
pollution, and provided useful information regarding long-range transboundary air 
pollution to policy makers to avoid adverse environmental impacts and to improve 
environmental conditions in the Northeast Asian region (Chu et al., 2005, pp.30-
31). South Korea has emphasized LTP over EANET rather than contributing to 
EANET operation with the fact that South Korea has regarded EANET as a 
Japanese-centric mechanism which is very restrictive in promoting collective 
regional environment protection. 
 
Beyond these South Korean initiative environmental mechanisms in 
countering transboundary air pollution, South Korea has set transboundary 
environmental policies that has put more emphasis on bilateral cooperation rather 
than solving them in multilateral cooperation like Japan has. South Korea 
recognized that environmental cooperation in East Asia was still in the 
rudimentary stage despite regional countries’ efforts and the basic frameworks. 
South Korea detected the difficulty of adjusting to other East Asian countries’ 
dynamic and diverse interests, so it has preferred negotiations or talks between 
two countries that are concerned. The different degrees of environmental hazard 
could cause the different levels of damage and points of environmental protection 
interest. For instance, South Korea has detected more threats from the Asian dust 
than Japan due to its geographical proximity to China and Mongolia. Asian dust 
has been one of the most serious natural disaster issues in Korea while it is a 
minor issue for Japan (MERK, 2008, pp.4-6). South Korea has carried out various 
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intergovernmental joint research and programs with China since 1993 to solve the 
Asian dust issue (MERK, 2002b). South Korea believed in a high efficiency of 
bilateral cooperation in monitoring and evaluating the transboundary pollutants 
(Chu et al., 2005). 
 
4.5.2    Korea’s Commitments to EANET 
South Korea believed that regardless of consistent and numerous 
collaborations between states, research institutions, NGOs, and other corporations, 
most joint efforts were not very efficient. Most environmental improvement 
projects in East Asia did not succeed or not promoted well. Therefore, South 
Korea has concerned in improving the efficiency of the East Asia environmental 
cooperation by adjusting similar and duplicating other collaborated activities. 
South Korea believed that the competitive parallel relationship between Japanese 
and Korean initiatives had influenced the failure of a regional environmental 
cooperation with the overlapping of their covering areas. 
 
South Korea assumed that the adjustment of activities between LTP and 
EANET would improve the current transboundary air pollution mechanism in 
East Asia. For EANET’s role adjustment, South Korea has suggested some 
structural improvements in its cooperative system (LTP, 1997). South Korea 
believed that EANET should be similar to the European EMEP which has shared 
the role of the functions in which EANET is centrally controlled by Japan (Chu et 
al., 2005). For instance, Japan measures acid substance and operates the 
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comprehensive chemical analysis center; while South Korea transforms LTP and 
researches on long distance transboundary air pollution; and China, the biggest 
pollutant emitter nation, should install and operate the emission analysis center. 
 
Having LTP specialized in the field of transboundary air pollution and 
setting it up as the “Northeast Asia Transboundary Air Pollution Research Center”, 
South Korea understood that this would be a more effective form of mechanism. 
South Korea discredited EANET’s role and stated that EANET should go beyond 
the simple operation in constructing and monitoring acid rain metrological 
networks and should observe and evaluate the emission, range, and impacts of 
transboundary air pollution in the Northeast Asian region (Chu et al., 2005). South 
Korea’s request in EANET role adjustment with LTP corresponded to Korea’s 
objection of the Japanese centric problem solving in environment. LTP implies 
that South Korea’s rivalry with Japan has made Korea overly sensitive to Japan.  
 
South Korea’s lack of support in EANET was showed by South Korea’s 
preference to LTP which suggested the role adjustment between LTP and EANET. 
Moreover this research argues South Korea’s low EANET budget support implies 
Korea’s lack of interest in supporting EANET. One of the major challenges for 
EANET is its budget. Throughout the intergovernmental meetings, Japan and 
other participants have discussed financial commitment and the necessity of 
financial cooperation to operate EANET. However, regardless of the participant 
countries’ agreement on budget burden sharing, Japan still fulfills the operational 
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costs of EANET largely by itself. South Korea is not the exceptional country 
where it has not cooperated well in contributing money to EANET operation. 
According to EANET monitoring costs shared by participating countries in East 
Asia in 2002, South Korea spent $125,000 on its national monitoring activities 
while Japan spent $874,000 (EANET, 2003). South Korea was EANET’s third 
biggest donator among the other donators-Japan, China, Mongolia, and Russia, 
but it was the smallest portion of South Korea’s environmental budget compared 
to the Korean Ministry of Environment which had a budget of $ 8,358,333.33 for 
Northeast Asia transboundary air pollutant monitoring in 2002 (MERK, 2001, 
p.19). According to a report from the Korea Environment Institution in 2010, the 
Korean government set a budget of around $7,151,403.59 to carry out research 
regarding transboudndary air pollution (MOE, 2011, P.63). Moreover, Professor 
Cho Seog Yeon who participated the thirteenth session of the Intergovernmental 
meeting on the acid deposition monitoring network in East Asia in 2011 said that 
South Korea’s annual contribution to EANET is around $50,000 while LTP is 
over $ 9,413,536.67. 
21
 
 
Moreover, according to the report of the Korea Environment Institute 
(KEI) published in March 2011, South Korea decided to promote the Earth and 
Environmental Satellite Propulsion Committee and strengthen international 
cooperation with leading research institutions like National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) and National Institute for Environmental Studies 
                                                          
21
 Interviewed Professor Cho Seog Yeon at the Department of Environmental Engineering at Inha 
University on February 19, 2013. 
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(NIES) for the improvement of the transboundary air pollution prevention faced 
by the East Asian regions (Chu et al., 2005, p.6). South Korea believed the 
cooperation with more advanced external institutions enable Korea to detect the 
exact amount, location, and time of pollutant emission. South Korea has 
emphasized more its monitoring system or networks, pursuing more advanced 
technologies and not cooperating or joining Japan’s high technology, but adopting 
outside technologies. According to the evaluation made by the KEI, South Korea 
believed that beyond South Korea’s budget deficiency and relatively less 
advanced technologies, EANET and LPT did not have significant differences. In 
fact, the KEI believed LPT was more of a cooperative and regional consensus 
based mechanism. To it sum up, South Korea did not recognize the necessity of 
EANET over LPT and believed LPT can replace EANET once its budget and 
technological issues are solved. 
 
South Korea’s contribution toward EANET has not been substantial but 
at the same time it also promoted the development of EANET. South Korea has 
preferred regional institutions’ dispersed role play, avoiding a one nation-centric 
operation, promoted bilateral cooperation rather than multilateral ones, and 
adopted external techniques and equipment in managing transboundary air 
pollutants rather than adopting Japan’s techniques. This explains South Korea’s 
lack of contribution to EANET, balancing its vulnerability while handling 
transnational problems by itself and its rivalry with Japan. On the other hand, 
presumptively Japan’s initiated regional institutions not only to improve regional 
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environment conditions but also to obtain East Asian region’s environmental 
governance. Japan could make a larger contribution to the East Asian region’s 
environment if it invested in the technologies and budgets to the existing 
mechanisms. However, Japan had come up with the new mechanism in which 
major activities are remarkably similar to the existing mechanisms. This research 
concludes that EANET represents Japan’s rivalry and leadership seeking within 
the East Asian region.  
 
4.6   Conclusion 
Environmental regionalism was not very successful in East Asia due to 
Japan and South Korea’s regional commitments. As Japan-Korea FTA did not 
come into force which disrupted the liberalization of trade in the region, Japan and 
South Korea also could not have a collaborative relationship in progressing a 
regional environment institution smoothly. China being the source of acid 
deposition of region has notified Japan and Korea to act swiftly in resolving the 
transboundary air pollution. Japan and South Korea were forewarn to cope with 
this sever pollution problem by developing a regional cooperative environmental 
institution. Consequently, Japan initiated EANET with the aim of developing it as 
a major environmental regional institution but South Korea made an inadequate, 
commitment towards EANET due to its rivalry towards Japan and different target 
of interstate cooperation. 
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 In forming EANET, Japan played a pivotal role by forming annual expert 
meetings before launching the network and providing financial and technical 
support after the start up of EANET. Japan’s initiative comprised of diverse 
motivations including China and its interest in interstate cooperation with East 
Asian countries were at the center of Japan’s impetus. This chapter argues that 
Japan initiated EANET as a way to help East Asian countries be more aware of 
the need for preventing environmental contamination of the region and behind its 
support it had hindsight of securing its leadership in East Asia. Japan has had the 
ambition to hold on to regional environmental leadership over China where it has 
lagged behind in addressing and supporting environmental problems in East Asia.  
 
While Japan rivals China over holding the environmental leadership in 
East Asia, South Korea has targeted Japan as its rival in the environmental issues. 
Korea’s rivalry towards Japan had Korea initiated LTP which was very similar in 
functions EANET. The rivalry of Korea towards Japan has caused little support 
for EANET, preferring its initiative of LTP over Japan’s initiative EANET by 
suggesting role adjustments between LTP and EANET in which Japan does not 
hold the most power. Moreover, South Korea has given a low priority over 
EANET budget assistance. Moreover, Korea’s scope of interest was fixed to 
Northeast Asia so that the Korean government evaluated the substantial need of 
having a regional environment institute that covers the Northeast Asia region not 
the East Asia-wide.  
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Japan and South Korea’s rivalries and differences in target of interstate 
cooperation have made the two countries unable to meet a common goal to 
commit to for cooperation. In the development of EANET as a major 
environmental regional institute, South Korea was very important. Japan and 
South Korea were in the same position against China’s pollutants in that if they 
took the same position, they could have persuaded China to show more 
commitment to EANET and established a firm regional institution. However, this 
did not happen and South Korea came up with its own initiative and not 
contributing much to EANET. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has reviewed the components of regionalism in East Asia and 
factors that have made obstacles for a strong regional integration. A number of 
key nation states have competed for the initiatives of regional institution 
establishment. China, Japan, and the United States have led the controversy over 
the configuration of a regional institution and initiatives. This assessment agrees 
with the previous researches which have focused more on the rivalry between 
China, Japan, and the US. However, this thesis puts more focus on Japan and 
Korea’s rival relationship which has not been frequently touched upon enough in 
past research. It believes that the Japan-Korea rivalry has also been one of the 
crucial factors that have negatively influenced the East Asian regional integration. 
South Korea, situated at the crossroads of the four great powers, has been a 
middle power of the region. With its geographical advantage, it became a great 
mediator of its neighboring countries (Rozman, 2007). 
 
This thesis hypothesized that Japan and South Korea’s relations have 
disrupted the regional cooperation beyond the China-Japan and China-US 
rivalries, setting the framework of rivalry and different targets of interstate 
cooperation. Japan has competed with China while South Korea has a competitive 
rivalry with Japan which stemmed from a lot of discontent. This rivalry has 
caused the Japanese government to hold China in check, adopting a policy to 
promote amity with surrounding countries. Japan has set the amicable relations 
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with ASEAN countries to avoid a situation which China overtakes the leading 
position in the East Asian region. With China building relations with ASEAN, 
Japan has become more obsessive about China’s motive of building relations with 
ASEAN. Consequently, Japan could hardly concern about South Korea but rather 
concentrated more on ASEAN. In case of South Korea, it has an ongoing rivalry 
with Japan. Korea was afraid of gaining less than Japan when they conclude any 
agreement. Consequently, there is no agreement between Japan and Korea. In 
addition, Korean government has focused more on increasing cooperation with 
western countries like the US, and the European nations to expand political and 
economic powers to compete Japan. 
 
5.1  Rivalry Factor in Japan-Korea relations 
This thesis terms rivalry as a status where two countries compete against 
each other over the same objects to take the supremacy over them, adding the 
meaning one nation competes with another nation even though the latter nation 
may not be competing with the first nation. Defined term of rivalry applies to 
Japan and South Korea. To understand this rivalry and how this rivalry has 
influenced Japan and South Korea’s cooperative relations, this thesis adopts two 
case studies of environment and free trade agreement (FTA) and verifies the two 
countries’ rivalry relations which have negatively influenced the regionalism in 
East Asia. 
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In case of FTA, Japan has felt a rivalry toward China because Japan used 
to be the world’s second largest economy and maintained the leading position in 
Asia but was replaced as the world’s second largest economy by the rise of China. 
The growth of China’s trade was remarkably fast pasted, while the growth of 
Japan’s trade was slowed and stagnated. China’s larger number of population, 
rapid economic development, and more international assertiveness gave China a 
clear edge over Japan. Japan has fears of being left behind by a fast-rising China, 
who is wielding formidable economic, military, and diplomatic power in the East 
Asian region. As result, the Japanese bureaucrats initiated a regional oriented FTA 
to check China as China concluded a FTA with ASEAN in January 2004. Japan 
emphasized to construct a cohesive Japan-ASEAN economic relation by adopting 
a dual track approach which has forged bilateral partnerships with individual 
ASEAN countries alongside with negotiating an agreement with ASEAN as a 
whole. Japan’s rivalry toward China over the leadership role in East Asia has 
drawn Japan’s interests away from the JKFTA. This has negatively impacted the 
progress of the JKFTA which was halted in 2004 when China concluded a FTA 
with ASEAN. Japan’s anxiety over China has distracted Japan from concentrating 
on South Korea, another important power nation. This has disrupted relations 
between Japan and Korea and has influenced the steady progress of regional 
integration. 
 
South Korea has a rivalry with Japan over trade. With an overlapping 
industrial structure, Korea faced a high possibility of losing its market position 
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from Japan. Korea has had very similar export commodities from Japan in which 
Japanese commodities were superior to Korean exports. Moreover, Korean export 
products have had relatively high tariff rates; less advanced manufacturing goods; 
and a high dependency on Japan’s export goods. Therefore, Korea has concluded 
FTAs with huge economies like the EU and the US from outside of the region. 
Currently, South Korea concentrates on completing a FTA with China to obtain 
additional market competitiveness in East Asian region to compete with Japan. 
Moreover, South Koreans have been reluctant to participate in the on-going East 
Asia-wide FTA called RCEP with the doubt of its initiative. They have regarded 
the Japanese government has a strong support for RCEP from behind the scenes, 
which has reflected Japan’s policy direction.  
 
In case of Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), 
Japan initiated it as a way to help East Asian countries to be more aware of the 
needs for preventing environmental contamination of the region. With their fast 
economic growth, environmental pollution has besieged the region. Through 
EANET, Japan has made many efforts and significant contributions in confronting 
acid deposition issue in East Asia. This thesis argues that Japan’s abundant 
assistance in regional environmental protection has led to the initiation of EANET 
to secure its leadership in East Asia. Japan has had the ambition to hold on to 
regional environmental leadership over China where it has lagged behind in 
addressing and supporting environmental problems in East Asia. Furthermore, 
Japan has also provided environmental technologies and expertise to East Asian 
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countries through various environmental-related initiatives beyond EANET to 
consolidate its power over rival China. 
 
South Korea has targeted Japan as its rival in the environmental issues. 
Korea’s rivalry towards Japan initiated Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollutants 
in Northeast Asia (LTP) which was very similar in functions EANET. LTP 
expected to solve transboundary air pollution collectively through the 
collaboration among a number of regional countries, experts, and other actors, 
apart from Japanese leadership. Furthermore, the rivalry between Korea and Japan 
has caused little support for EANET, preferring its initiative LTP over Japan’s 
initiative EANET by suggesting role adjustments between LTP and EANET. By 
decentralizing EANET and adjusting EANET and LTP roles, Japan would not 
hold the most power. Moreover, South Korea has given a low priority over 
EANET budget assistance. 
 
 This research currently stresses rivalry relations between Japan and South 
Korea. However, this does not signify that there has been no cooperation between 
two countries. Japan and South Korea have made a lot of effort to enhance their 
cooperative relationships and have cooperated in various aspects of economic and 
diplomatic policy. Japanese and Korean governments also have shared the talks 
on expanding in the fields of cooperation to 1) knowledge, culture, media; 2) 
human network; 3) security; 4) nuclear safety and energy; 5) environment; 6) 
economy; and 7) technology (Joint Research Project, 2013). However, despite two 
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countries’ joint research and cooperation, their collaborations have remained to be 
relevant to bilateral relations, not expanded to the regionalism in East Asia. This 
is because of the deep hostilities like brutal historical memories and these kinds of 
issues which have continuously disturbed two countries’ genuine cooperative 
relationships. Consequently, Japan and South Korea have promoted several 
bilateral cooperation, but in the context of East Asia, their cooperation is very 
limited.  
 
5.2  Difference in Target of Interstate Cooperation 
The continuous disputes between Japan and South Korea have been also 
related to the two countries’ difference in target of interstate cooperation. The 
different targets of interstate cooperation refer to Japan’s interest in an East Asia-
wide interstate interaction while South Korea’s target of Northeast Asia interstate 
coordination or global-oriented cooperation. 
 
In case of FTA, Japan has targeted East Asia-wide interstate cooperation. 
Japan first initiated East Asia-wide economic partnership called Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) which has played against Chinese 
regional trade initiative, East Asian FTA (EAFTA). Japan’s rivalry over China in 
holding a leadership in East Asia has drawn Japan’s interests into ASEAN or 
broadly saying the entire East Asian region. With the intensified competition 
between EAFTA and CEPEA, these two region-wide FTAs were consolidated 
into an ASEAN-led East Asia FTA architecture called Regional Comprehensive 
113 
 
Economic Partnership (RCEP). However Japan had continuously participated 
actively in RCEP by simultaneously involving in the Trans Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) with its main purpose of East Asian cooperation. 
 
South Korea has targeted Northeast Asia and major powers outside of East 
Asia and Northeast Asia for its interstate cooperation. Korean companies have 
expanded their global market and maximized the effectiveness of FTA by 
adopting the US FTA as a model and forming closer relationships with the US and 
other major powers outside of the region. South Korea which has highlighted 
FTAs with large economies such as the EU and the US with the aim of expanding 
its substantial economic growth, South Korea has showed its interest through its 
negotiation between China and Japan over an East Asia-wide FTA. The analysis 
conducted by the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) reported that South 
Korea’s FTA strategy in East Asia has focused on a China-Korea FTA (CKFTA) 
or China-Japan-Korea FTA (CJKFTA) rather than on an East Asia-wide FTA 
(Choi & Lee, 2010, p.21). 
 
In case of EANET, Japan’s target of interstate environmental cooperation 
in covering East Asia is reflected through several transboundary air pollution 
policies: ECO-ASIA (Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific), 
Chapter 9 of the National Action Plan for Agenda 21 and the ERTDF (The 
Environment Research and Technology Development Fund) which were 
launched to exchange views on solving transboundary air pollution in East 
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Asia. Japan has been a leader in environmental technologies and expertise for East 
Asian countries through the various environment-related multilateral and bilateral 
cooperative initiatives with East Asian countries. The Japanese government’s 
environmental initiatives mirror Japan’s target of interstate cooperation in East 
Asia. 
 
The Korean government evaluated the substantial need of having a 
regional environment institute that covers the Northeast Asia region where the 
most rapidly developing countries in economy are located. The Korean Ministry 
of Environment suggested and promoted the initiatives called Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollutants in North East Asia (LTP), North-East Asian 
Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) and 
Tripartite Environment Ministers’ Meeting (TEMM) for the improvement of 
Northeast Asian region’s air quality. South Korea’s scope of interest to Northeast 
Asia region was apparent with the low interest in East Asia-wide environmental 
cooperation while having a higher interest in a Northeast Asia-wide 
environmental cooperation. 
 
5.3  Japan-Korea Relations and Regionalism in East Asia 
In explaining the dilemma of East Asia regional integration, most past 
studies have set China- Japan’s rivalry over taking a leadership status in the East 
Asia regionalization as the major assuming factor. However, this research believes 
South Korea’s stance should also be added to the picture of the overall 
115 
 
regionalism in East Asia as South Korea is also very important to regionalism in 
East Asia. This research hypothesizes that the Japan-Korea relations have 
disrupted the swift regional integration progress in East Asia. This paper sets two 
case studies, trade and environment, to see how Japan and South Korea’s relations, 
rivalry and different targets of interstate cooperation have caused many 
discrepancies, which have influenced the regionalization of East Asia. In the case 
of trade, Japan and Korea’s rivalry mattered the most especially on the conclusion 
of the Japan-Korea FTA to which if they concluded the negotiation sooner, they 
could have provided a good model of FTA for East Asia. Moreover, South 
Korea’s support for Japan’s initiative CEPEA could have led to the East Asian 
regionalism with the format of CEPEA, but none of these took a place. With 
South Korea’s very ambiguous stance in the rivalry relationship in the Japan-
Korea trade and Japan’s lack of interest in completing the FTA with South Korea, 
the achievement of regionalism in East Asia has been difficult. Furthermore, in 
the case of environment, the Japan-Korea rivalry has negatively influenced the 
region-wide environmental cooperation in East Asia. While Japan initiated the 
EANET cooperation as a means to maintain regional environmental leadership 
over China, South Korea targeted Japan as its rival for regional environmental 
issues. Such rivalry relations led to Korea’s little support for EANET, an 
environmental institution in East Asia, since it hoped to advance the LTP, a 
similar institution in Northeast Asia. 
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5.4    Issues for the Future Research 
The issues of Japan and South Korea’s relations are very important, but 
this research could not show much by analyzing only two areas of case studies, 
trade and environment. Broader fields of investigation will be helpful in the future 
of East Asia’s regional integration. The delicate and important issues such as East 
Asia energy security, environmental disaster management, and historical 
consciousness are respectable fields to be investigated. First, East Asia’s swift 
economic development has accompanied with the energy exhaustion. Since the 
late 1900s, East Asian countries’ consumption of energy resources has remarkably 
increased (IEEJ, 2006). Energy, environment, and economic development have 
become closely tied together in East Asian affairs and since the region’s existing 
and anticipated utilization of energy resources is both economically and 
environmentally unsustainable in the long-term which the energy security 
becomes a prominent agenda issue in the region (Saha, 2003; Hayes & Hippel, 
2006). Amongst the East Asian region, the two most developed economies, Japan 
and South Korea, have an energy import dependency ratios over 80 percent and 
their competition for future energy supplies have exhausted region wide 
cooperation (Dent, 2008, p.251). Second, beyond the transboundary air pollution, 
the East Asian region also has faced severe environmental disasters in which 
countries need to cooperate. For instance, the frequent and strong earthquakes, 
storms, and tsunamis need to be studied and prevented with regional measures. 
Third, the historical discord between Japan and Korea has disrupted the 
improvement in two countries’ relationships, troubling the improvement of the 
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regional integration in a broad sense. Koreans scorn Japan with the bad memory 
of colonization. However, on the other hand, Japanese government seemed to 
have a disparity in historical awareness with South Korea. Koreans have had ill 
feelings toward Japan, which can hardly settle down. 
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